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U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A MODEL
FOR GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW?
RICHARD B. STEWART*
I
INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the potential for drawing on U.S. administrative law
in the development of a global administrative law1 to secure greater accountability for the growing exercise of regulatory authority by international or
transnational governmental decisionmakers in a wide variety of fields. U.S.
administrative law and practice might form one useful point of departure for
developing both “top down” and “bottom up” approaches to understanding and
further developing global administrative law. A global administrative law must,
of course, draw on legal principles and practices from many domestic and regional legal systems and traditions, as well as from sources in international law.
Accordingly, the U.S.-based perspective offered in this Article is only one of
many that must be considered.
The past several decades have witnessed an explosive development of a
great variety of international economic and social regulatory regimes.2 These
regimes have been created in response to the rise of a global market economy
(itself constructed through private and public international law regimes), the
consequences of economic, social, environmental, informational, and other
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1. The term international administrative law has in recent decades been limited to administrative
rules, procedures, and tribunals relating to the staff of international organizations. See C.F.
AMERASINGHE, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS, p. 103-09 (1988). Earlier in the twentieth century, a broader conception of international administration and administrative law was recognized. See Paul S. Reinsch, International Administrative Law and National Sovereignty, 3 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1909); Pierre Kazansky,
Théorie de l’administration internationale, 9 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
353 (1902).
2. Some of these global regulatory regimes are bilateral. Others are multilateral, including some
of regional and some of global scope. Further, as developed below, some of these regimes are established by treaties to which states are parties, while others consist of networks or other cooperative arrangements among domestic officials responsible for a given area of regulation, and still others are
private or hybrid public–private in character. This article refers generically to all these different types
of regimes as global regulatory regimes.
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forms of interdependence, and the perceived inadequacies of purely national
solutions in the problems generated by those consequences. These regulatory
regimes encompass a wide variety of subject areas, including trade; finance and
banking; environment, health, and safety; pharmaceuticals; transportation and
communications; conditions on financial assistance; human rights; and unlawful
or undesirable activities. These regimes respond to the failures of both markets
and of decentralized national systems of regulation to secure important economic and social values. They also often include bodies that are administrative
in character and that make regulatory decisions and create regulatory law that
is domestically implemented. As Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart explain in
“The Emergence of Global Administrative Law,” 3 the traditional paradigms of
international law and of administrative law at the domestic level cannot adequately account for or address these new global regulatory regimes, which are
creating a new field of global administration and administrative law.
How can these global regulatory regimes be made accountable to the actors
or publics whose interests they are supposed to serve? This is the question being addressed by new, emerging forms of global administrative law. Putting the
issue in terms of accountability immediately raises the questions of to whom
account is due, and by what means.4 One approach is to ensure that administrative decisionmakers implementing a global regulatory regime—which can include domestic administrative officials implementing global regulatory norms as
well as officials at the global level—are faithful to that regime and the states
that have established it. Another is accountability to those ultimately subject to
regulation, including private individuals and entities, business firms, and in
some cases NGOs, in order to ensure that their rights are secured and their interests respected. A third approach is accountability to the broader publics,
either domestic or global, that are protected or otherwise affected by the regime. It must also be borne in mind that administrative law is only one means
among many others that can be deployed to promote accountability and help to
ensure that global regulatory regimes in fact serve their justificatory ends, raising the question of its appropriate role in relation to other mechanisms.5
Further, what should the normative ambition of global administrative law
be? Should it aim to ensure the smooth and effective instrumental functioning
of global regulatory regimes? Should it ensure that administrative agents are
faithful to their principals, however defined? Should it seek to protect the
rights of private actors? Should it secure the interests of relevant domestic or
global publics? Based on a broader conception of its role, what is the relation
between global administrative law and the much debated question whether, and
to what extent, governance at the global level can be conceived and realized on
a democratic basis?
3. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (Summer/Autumn 2005) [hereinafter Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart].
4. See Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99
AM POL. SCI. REV. 29 (2005); Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 3, at 27-42.
5. See id.
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A. Three Basic Types of International Regulatory Regimes
For purposes of this article, three basic types of international regulatory regimes can be distinguished:
Treaty-based international regulatory regimes are established by treaties or
other agreements among nations that establish and oversee implementation of
international regulatory standards. These regimes often include a secretariat
and other institutional features of an international intergovernmental organization. Examples include trade regimes like NAFTA and the WTO, environmental regimes such as the Montreal Protocol (regulating stratospheric ozone
depleting chemicals), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,
and the various U.N. organizations.
Transnational regulatory networks are developed by national regulatory officials responsible for specific areas of domestic regulation. These officials
communicate and meet informally, and may agree to uniform or harmonized
regulatory standards and practices in order to reduce barriers to trade and
commerce created by differing national regulations. They also address transnational regulatory problems, including those posed by multinational enterprises
operating across many jurisdictions, that exceed purely domestic capabilities.6
Having agreed to such standards or practices with their counterparts in other
countries, these officials then adopt and implement them in their capacities as
domestic regulatory officials. In addition to or as an alternative to agreement
on common regulatory standards, such officials may pool information and discuss and coordinate regulatory policies and enforcement practices. These
global regulatory networks have emerged in areas such as antitrust, banking,
securities, telecommunications, chemicals regulation, taxation, and transportation safety. For example, national regulators might agree to accept each other’s
product regulatory standards as mutually equivalent, or pool information and
coordinate antitrust measures to address the practices of multinational firms.
Another form of international regulatory cooperation consists of mutual
recognition agreements and cooperative regulatory equivalence determinations
by regulators in different countries with different regulatory requirements.
Under mutual recognition agreements, which are typically bilateral in character, regulators in one country accept the product or service regulatory certification procedures or standards of another country as equivalent to or compatible
with their own, in exchange for similar recognition of their own measures.7 Pursuant to such agreements, products or services originating in one country and
complying with its regulatory requirements can enter or be provided in the host
country without being subjected to its separate, additional regulatory require6. For an introduction to global regulatory networks, see ANN-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW
WORLD ORDER (2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2000-2001); see also David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The
Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998).
7. See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes—The
Dilemmas of Accountability, Rights and Democracy Beyond the State, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263
(Summer/Autumn 2005).
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ments, to the extent provided by the agreement. Mutual recognition can include the jurisdictions’ differing mechanisms for determining (including through
certification procedures) conformance with applicable regulatory standards
and/or the standards themselves; the former currently predominate.8
As an alternative to entering into more or less formal agreements providing
for mutual recognition, regulators in different countries can follow more informal methods of cooperation under which a regulatory agency accepts regulatory conformity determinations by an agency in another as equivalent to its own
in the expectation of reciprocal treatment.9 These forms of actively managed,
horizontal regulatory cooperation between administrative agencies in different
areas are being used increasingly to address technical barriers to trade and differences in environmental, health, safety, and other regulatory standards and
promote trade by reducing or eliminating need for multiple regulatory approvals for internationally traded products and services.10 The use of such arrangements with respect to services is currently limited but is expected to grow.11
In practice, the distinction between treaty-based and network regulatory regimes is not always clear-cut. Formal international regimes often provide a forum for informal networking among domestic regulatory officials. Some regulatory networks function through their own international organizations (which,
however, are generally not treaty-based), although others are loose-knit and
highly informal. Likewise, practice might often blur the distinction between
adoption of common standards by informal networks of domestic government
regulators and mutual recognition arrangements and equivalence practices by
such regulators. In principle, mutual recognition agreements and other cooperative regulatory equivalence practices are a way of accommodating different
substantive regulatory standards and conformity determination methods in different countries, but they might evolve toward harmonization of standards and
methods.

8. See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Rebecca Steffenson, Managed Mutual Recognition in the Transatlantic Marketplace, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS 4, 5 (Mark Pollack & Gregory Shaffer,
eds., 2005).
9. See, e.g., Australia’s Meat Safety Enhancement Program (MSEP), 64 Fed. Reg. 30299 (June 7,
1999) [hereinafter Australian Meat] (finding Australia’s system of meat inspection equivalent); Francesca Bignami, The Challenge of Cooperative Regulatory Relations after Enlargement, in LAW AND
GOVERNANCE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 97 (George A. Bermann & Katharina Pistor,
eds., 2004).
10. Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of New
Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 50-54 (2002) (discussing this phenomenon within the context of the U.S.-E.U.
mutual recognition agreements); Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: The WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization of Standards, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 823 (2002)
[hereinafter Accountable Governance]; Linda Horton, Mutual Recognition Agreements and Harmonization, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 692 (1998).
11. Kalypso Nicolaidis, Globalization with Human Faces: Managed Mutual Recognition and the
Free Movement of Professionals, in THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN THE EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION PROCESS, 4 (Fiorella Kostoris and Padoa Schioppa eds., 2005) [hereinafter Nicolaidis,
Human Faces].
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Non-state actors, including business and NGO representatives, participate
in varying degrees in these three different types of global regulatory arrangements. In addition, the weaknesses of global government and the perceived
need for regulatory harmonization have stimulated the development at the
global level of private standard setting and regulatory organizations, such as the
International Standards Organization, organized primarily or exclusively by
business, and hybrid private-public regulatory regimes involving businesses,
NGOs, and in some cases states or international organizations.12 While these
global organizations often use administrative law tools to bolster their operation and legitimacy, they are beyond the scope of this Article. Nor does this
Article address another important element of global administrative law: the
development by international authorities, such as the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body and international investment treaty tribunals of administrative law, of requirements that governments must follow in domestic regulatory decisions with
external consequences.13
B. Vertical and Horizontal Linkages Within Global Regulatory Regimes
Both formal treaty-based regimes and global regulatory networks operate
through two-way vertical linkages between the domestic and international levels.
First, domestic officials represent their governments at the global level. In
formal regimes, a national delegation might involve representation of several
ministries or departments, often headed by a foreign ministry official, structured through established protocols of supervision and review by the represented government.14 In global regulatory networks and the establishment of
mutual recognition regimes, the representation process is typically far less structured and officials might represent only their own agency, affording them much
greater freedom of action. In addition to acting as representatives of their respective governments in these various settings, officials also function as members of the global regime, and might develop a personal stake in its success.
Second, measures agreed at the global level are typically implemented
through domestic regulatory regimes rather than directly by regulation of nonstate actors by the global regime. Subject to a few but perhaps growing number
of exceptions, treaty-based regimes lack authority directly to regulate the conduct of non-state actors.15 But, under a “statutory–adjudicatory” model of regu-

12. See Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 3, at 16.
13. See id. at 44; Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
14. Business and NGO representatives may also participate, both as members of delegations or as
observers in international negotiation sessions. See David A. Wirth, Public Participation in International Processes: Environmental Case Studies at the National and International Levels, 7 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 18-22 (1996). Such participation is rarer in the case of informal regulatory networks.
15. Some of the exceptions are discussed in infra Section III.
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latory governance,16 such regimes generate norms, including norms generated
by regime administrative bodies; international law makes these norms legally
binding on party states or creates other strong incentives for their domestic implementation.
Informal regulatory networks lack direct coercive regulatory authority over
non-state actors, and the measures agreed to are not legally binding on states.
Implementation at the domestic level of policies and measures agreed to by
networks depends on and can generally be accomplished by the initiative of the
relevant participating national officials, often through the exercise of their existing administrative authority, without the need for legislation or action by other
government authorities. This “regulatory convergence” model of governance
typically operates without any formal transmission of legal provisions or decisions from the international to the domestic level.17 Thus, the network of central bank governors forming the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
agreed on new capital requirements for banks; the participating government
officials then followed these harmonized measures in exercising their domestic
administrative regulatory authority.18
Horizontal arrangements for regulatory harmonization or cooperation
through mutual recognition and equivalence determination arrangements follow a different approach. Each participating domestic actor, in regulating
products and services originating in another country, accepts or defers to their
compliance with the other’s procedures and standards as satisfying its own requirements in light of memorialized or more informal mutual agreements or
other indicia of expected reciprocity.19
C. Transparency and Opportunities for Access and Participation
Both treaty-based regimes and global regulatory networks typically function
against the background of traditional diplomatic norms of confidentiality in negotiation.The transaction costs and other impediments to successful negotiations are already high, especially for multilateral agreements, even if negotiations are confidential. Transparency could aggravate these impediments. For
example, confidentiality has been thought justified on the need to prevent
threats to successful negotiations by domestic interest groups who might mobilize to block, for example, trade liberalization. In the case of regulatory agreements, these agreements for confidentiality are reinforced by the premise that
the issues involved are often technical and appropriately resolved by experts.

16. See Daniel Tarullo, Law and Governance in a Global Economy, 93 AM. SOC. INT’L L.
PROCEEDINGS 105, 109-11 (1999).
17. Id. at 109.
18. See Zaring, supra note 6, at 283-84.
19. Whereas, normally, mutual recognition agreements will be negotiated between governments,
recent research indicates that in some areas such agreements will only be possible when at least one of
the parties is a private professional association. Nicolaidis & Steffenson, supra note 8, at 13. This is
particularly true in the services sector, in which individual professions are regulated on sub-national
levels, therefore making a government-to-government agreement difficult to reach. Id.
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Treaty-based regimes, however, operate in significant part through formal,
public legal acts, and typically make decisions through established rules and
processes, promoting transparency. Non-state actors, including business and
NGO representatives, may be part of national delegations and in many treatybased, international regulatory regimes enjoy observer status, allowing them to
monitor negotiations and participate at an informal level. Networks and horizontal coordination arrangements, by contrast, operate much more informally,
and their decisions and decisionmaking processes are generally significantly less
transparent. In considering the potential application of administrative law
mechanisms to global regulatory regimes, it is thus important to understand
what factors favor the use of either formal, treaty-based regimes or more informal arrangements to address particular types of regulatory problems.
D. Issues of Control, Accountability, Participation, and Responsiveness: Domestic and Global Perspectives
The dramatic growth of powerful global regulatory regimes poses important
governance issues of control, accountability, participation, and responsiveness.
These questions can be viewed from either a domestic or a global perspective.
From the domestic perspective, the three different types of international
regulatory regimes described above have been attacked in the United States
and elsewhere on the ground that they result in important changes in domestic
law without being adequately subject to the domestic systems of political and
legal accountability and control that would apply to purely domestic regulatory
measures. While treaties require ratification, treaty-based regimes increasingly
adopt regulatory measures through subsidiary lawmaking authorities, including
the conference of the parties, administrative bodies, and dispute settlement
bodies. Further, new regulatory norms adopted by international regulatory regimes, whether treaty-based or network, can often be implemented by executive branch agencies under their existing statutory authorities without the need
for new legislation. Implementation of global regulatory norms by domestic
agencies through rulemaking or adjudication might in some cases be subject to
domestic administrative law procedures and judicial review, but the underlying
norm was adopted through supranational processes that are often not.20 Some
binding international norms adopted by treaty-based regimes might allow no or
only limited discretion in domestic implementation, short-circuiting the role of
domestic administrative law. In other cases, especially in horizontal methods of
regulatory cooperation, domestic implementation is accomplished though informal determinations or exercises of enforcement discretion that are not subject to procedural requirements and, especially in the case of enforcement discretion, are also not ordinarily subject to judicial review.21 Moreover, even
20. See Eleanor Kinney, The Emerging Field of International Administrative Law: Its Content and
Potential, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 415, 425-32 (2002).
21. See Linda Horton, supra note 10, at 710-25; Sidney Shapiro, International Trade Agreements,
Regulatory Protection, and Public Accountability, 54 ADM. L. REV. 435, 440-46 (2002) [hereinafter International Trade Agreements].
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when domestic administrative law disciplines are applicable, they generally apply only to domestic implementation and not to the global component, which is
often by far the more important in terms of the regulatory outcome.
Critics accordingly contend that the norms, policies, and practices adopted
by global regulatory regimes are not subject to adequate political, public, and
legal accountability. The criticisms have both procedural and substantive components and focus on either domestic or global level implications. Regarding
procedure, treaty-based regimes like the WTO and the IMF have been widely
attacked for imposing measures generated by secret processes without opportunity for participation and review by affected domestic interests. The displacement of domestic processes of regulatory accountability is most obvious in
the case of international treaty-based regimes whose norms are domestically
binding or that must be incorporated in domestic law. While less salient, similar
displacement effects from the decisions of regulatory networks and horizontal
cooperative regimes is also increasingly under fire.22 Examples include the decision by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to grant equivalency
status to the Australian Meat Safety Enhancement Program,23 and the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) decision to issue equivalence determinations under the U.S.–E.U. Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) on pharmaceuticals without allowing for stakeholder input.24
Process-based criticisms of the domestic impact of international regulation
are joined with a substantive attack—that the absence of adequate mechanisms
of transparency, accountability, and control enables well-organized industrial
and financial interests to “capture” the two-level, global and domestic regulatory decisionmaking process to the detriment of the environment, consumers,
workers, and general social values and interests. Thus, “[i]nternational negotiations sometimes enable government leaders to do what they privately wish to
do, but are powerless to do domestically.”25 The vehement criticism by environmental and other NGOs in the United States and abroad of regulatory decisions by WTO and NAFTA tribunals, the IMF, the World Bank, and other international bodies is a virtual replay of Ralph Nader’s attacks on U.S. federal
regulatory agencies in the 1960s. Indeed, Nader is still around, making criticisms of the WTO that are virtually the same as those he levied against the

22. Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance, supra note 10, at 832-35 (critiquing the use of
mutual recognition agreements and equivalency determination and providing examples of several
potential problems that their use may cause). For an activist critique of mutual recognition agreements
as a strategy for harmonization, see TRANS-ATL. CONSUMER DIALOGUE, TACD BRIEFING PAPER ON
MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS (MRAS) (2001) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.),
available at http://www.tacd.org/db_files/files/ files-270-filetag.doc (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
23. Australian Meat, supra note 9; see Wallach, Accountable Governance, supra note 10, at 842-43.
24. See Wallach, Accountable Governance, supra note 10, at 853-54.
25. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L
ORG. 427, 457 (1988), quoted in Zaring, supra note 6, at 321. See generally Gregory Shaffer, WTO
Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics on Trade-Labor, Trade-Environment Linkages
for the WTO’s Future, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 608, 609 n.5 (2000).
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Federal Trade Commission thirty-five years ago.26 Some analysts have gone so
far as to argue that the rise of global regulation amounts to a fundamental alteration of the constitutional and governmental system in the United States by
creating a largely unaccountable “international branch” of the federal government that presents challenges comparable to those posed by the New Deal
regulatory state.27
Other critics focus on the deficiencies of governance at the level of the
global regulatory regime, rather than on the weakening or circumvention of
domestic mechanisms of political and legal control and accountability. They
make both process and substantive criticisms similar to those levied by their
domestically oriented counterparts. Process-based criticism tends to focus on
the secrecy of international and transnational regulatory decisional processes
and the lack of adequate opportunity for effective access to information, participation and input in global regulatory decisionmaking on the part of affected
global or domestic publics, including the interests of environmentalists, workers, consumers, developing countries, and indigenous peoples. Associated substantive criticisms are that the international regulatory process is dominated by
well-organized economic interests and powerful countries like the United
States, often resulting in inadequate regulatory protection and economic injustice.28
These dangers are acknowledged by students of global regulatory governance.29 They find that these arrangements, by making regulation a multijurisdictional, two-level or horizontal game, generate serious information
asymmetries, create significant agency costs, and increase the severity of the
collective action problems faced by unorganized “public” interests, thereby
serving to “filter” such interests and thus systematically disadvantage “larger
and politically weak groups” such as workers, the poor, the uneducated, or the
vulnerable.30
E. Potential Administrative Law Responses
One means of addressing these problems is the development of more effective and appropriate systems of administrative law to discipline and to hold accountable international regulatory decisionmaking and its domestic implementation.
One approach is the “bottom up” approach, extending the reach of domestic administrative law to assert more effective control and review with respect to
26. See Lori Wallach & Michelle Sforza, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION? CORPORATE
GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY ix (1999) (preface by Ralph Nader attacking
“an autocratic system of international governance that favors corporate interests”).
27. Chantal Thomas, Constitutional Change and International Government, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1
(2000).
28. See, e.g., Wallach, Accountable Governance, supra note 10, at 828.
29. See, e.g., Putnam, supra note 25; Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, supra note 21;
Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, supra note 6.
30. See Eyal Benvenisti, The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of the Evolution of Administrative Law in International Institution, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
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the supranational elements of domestic regulation. Thus, U.S. courts dealing
with domestic agency decisions implementing global regulatory norms and policies might seek to extend the administrative law procedural requirements and
techniques of judicial review applicable to purely domestic measures to include
the participation of U.S. regulatory officials in the global development of the
standards or other measures adopted domestically. For example, they might
require U.S. regulators to afford public notice and comment before entering
into global regulatory discussions and negotiations. U.S. agencies might be required to include a summary of the global regulatory discussions and decisions
in the notice of a proposed new rule implementing a global regulatory norm
and to provide an analysis and justification of the agencies’ role in those global
discussions and decisions in the final decision. Much more boldly, domestic
courts might refuse to recognize the decisions or norms of global regulatory regimes reached through decisionmaking processes that did not satisfy basic standards of regulatory due process. Other participating nations might impose similar requirements, which might coalesce and ripen into transnational administrative law.
Alternatively, under a “top down” approach, a treaty-based regime or even
a network or horizontal regulatory regime would adopt decisionmaking procedures to promote greater transparency and opportunities for participation and
input from affected interests and would establish reviewing bodies or other
mechanisms to promote accountability with respect to international or transnational regulatory decisions. Especially in this context, we would need to liberate ourselves from a court-centered conception of administrative law. International practice has already begun to generate a variety of different approaches:
the World Bank inspection panel,31 the procedures of the NAFTA Commission
for Environmental Cooperation,32 and the inclusion of NGOs in decisionmaking
by the Codex Alimentarius Commission on international food safety standards
and under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species.33
In assessing the potential for these and other strategies,34 we must frankly
recognize the challenge in developing administrative law mechanisms for global
regulation that will fulfill the negative (power checking) or affirmative (power
31. See generally Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case
of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 553 (1994).
32. See generally Sarah Richardson, Sovereignty, Trade, and the Environment—The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 183 (1998); Gillian Dale, III. NAFTA:
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 1996 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 26 (1996).
33. For discussions regarding NGO participation at Codex Alimentarius meetings, see Lori M.
Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: The WTO, NAFTA, and International
Harmonization of Standards, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 823, 836-38 (2002); Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decisionmaking, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 699, 718-20 (1994). For discussions
regarding NGO participation in the context of other international treaties and organizations, see
Daniel Vice, Note, Implementation of Biodiversity Treaties: Monitoring, Fact-Finding, and Dispute
Resolution, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 577, 616-9 (1997); Kal Raustiala, Note, The “Participatory
Revolution” in International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 547-48 (1997).
34. The E.U. comitology process provides another institutional model that might be adopted to the
global context. See generally EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS (Christian
Joerges & Ellen Vos, eds., 1999).
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directing) functions that administrative law serves in a wholly domestic setting.
Domestically, regulatory agencies generally operate at only one remove from
elected legislatures and in the shadow of review by independent courts. International regulatory networks and organizations operate at much greater remove from elected legislatures, and reviewing courts are generally absent.
There are good reasons for traditional diplomatic norms of secrecy and confidentiality negotiation and for the use of informal models of global regulatory
governance. Moreover, in many global regulatory regimes regulatory functions
have not (yet) crystallized into distinct administrative bodies that could be more
readily governed by administrative law.
II
U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In the United States and other liberal democratic industrialized nations,
administrative regulation is itself regulated by administrative law. It defines the
structural position of administrative agencies within the governmental system,
specifies the decisional procedures that they must follow, and determines the
availability and scope of review of their actions by the independent judiciary. It
furnishes a common set of principles and procedures that cut horizontally
across the many different substantive fields of administration and regulation. In
the United States, the system of federal administrative law has evolved significantly over the past forty years.35
A. Basic Elements of U.S. Federal Administrative Law
The system of administration in the United States, like that in many European and other nations, has certain structural elements that are fundamental:
(1) an elected legislative body that enacts statutes and delegates their implementation to executive officials; (2) an administrative body—a discrete, responsible decisionmaking entity, subordinate to and deriving authority from the legislature, that implements the relevant law through adjudication, rulemaking, or
other forms of administrative decision; (3) an independent court or a tribunal
that reviews the agency decisions for conformance with the terms of the statutory delegation and other applicable legal requirements; and (4) decisional
transparency including public access to government records.36
The four basic components of U.S. federal administrative law are contained
in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA): procedural requirements for
agency decisionmaking, threshold requirements for the availability of judicial
review, principles defining the scope of judicial review, and provisions regarding
public access to agency information.37
35. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
437, 448-51 (2003).
36. See Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUDIES 369, 370-76 (2001); Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First
Century, supra note 35.
37. 5 U.S.C §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 7521 (2004).

112905 03_STEWART.DOC

74

1/10/2006 10:23 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 68:63

The APA provides two basic types of procedures for agency decisionmaking: notice and comment rulemaking, and formal adjudication through trialtype hearings. These procedures generate an administrative record that serves
as the exclusive basis for agency decision and judicial review. They, together
with the Freedom of Information Act, provide transparency by generating extensive, publicly available records of the factual, analytic, and policy positions
of the agency and of outside parties as well as the basis for the agency’s decision.38
The APA authorizes courts to review four basic types of issues: the
agency’s compliance with applicable procedural requirements; the sufficiency of
the record evidence to support agency factual determinations; whether the
agency’s action is in conformity with applicable constitutional and statutory authorizations, requirements, and limitations, and other applicable law; and
whether the agency’s exercise of discretion pursuant to governing law is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.”39
B. The Traditional Model of Administrative Law and Subsequent Developments
The core of administrative law in the United States has focused on securing
the rule of law, respecting private rights, and protecting the liberty and property
of citizens by ensuring, through procedural requirements and judicial review,
that agencies act within constitutional limitations and the bounds of the statutory authority delegated by the legislature.40 The traditional subject of administrative law is government issuance or enforcement of an order imposing regulatory requirements or liabilities on a specific person. Here the function of administrative law is primarily negative: to prevent unlawful or arbitrary administrative exercise of coercive power against private persons. This is to ensure accountability for the legality of administrative decisions. This function is rooted
in principles of democratic self-government: the liberty or property of citizens
should be subject to restriction by government only when the citizenry has authorized such restrictions through the processes of electoral representation and
subject to the constitutional limitations and procedures adopted by the citizenry.41
In recent decades, U.S. administrative law has assumed a broader scope and
function through the development of an interest-representation model of administrative law. It has developed new and more inclusive procedural require38. See STEPHEN BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNSTEIN AND MATTHEW SPITZER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 652-60, 685-99, 872-86 (5th ed. 2001) [hereinafter
BREYER & STEWART].
39. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) (2004).
40. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669, 1671-76 (1975) [hereinafter Stewart, Reformation]; Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1203 (1982).
41. See Stewart, Reformation, supra note 40, at 1672-73.
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ments and has promoted transparency in administrative decisionmaking, including rulemaking. It has expanded the right to participate in agency decisionmaking procedures and the scope of judicial review to include a broad range of affected social and economic interests beyond those regulated. The scope of judicial review has been expanded to include, in addition, substantial review of
agencies’ exercise of policy discretion. Here administrative law has assumed
the affirmative task of ensuring that regulatory agencies exercise their policymaking discretion in a manner that is informed and responsive to the wide
range of social and economic interests and values affected by their decisions,
including the beneficiaries of regulatory programs as well as those subject to
regulatory controls and sanctions.42 The functions of administrative law go beyond the core of ensuring legal accountability to the broader goal of promoting
responsiveness and securing accountability to social interests and values.
The interest representation model implicitly recognizes the inherent limitations of an administrative law limited to a conception of democracy based solely
on electoral representation. The extent of power exercised by administrative
agencies and the breadth of the discretion that they enjoy under many statutory
delegations means that the system of electoral representation can afford only a
limited degree of accountability for their decisions. Broad statutory delegations
enable agencies to escape any such tight agent-principal link and leave them
with a large residual discretion that, on the traditional model, is not legally accountable. The interest-representation model seeks to fill this gap by creating a
surrogate process of representation through legal procedures rather than
through electoral mechanisms and to expand the scope of judicial review to include close scrutiny of agency exercises of discretion. Because of the heavy
emphasis placed by reviewing courts on the requirement that agencies address
and respond to the material submissions of all participating interests and provide a reasoned justification for the balance struck among them, this aspect of
administrative law reflects a deliberative conception of democracy.
The judiciary is the vital cockpit in administering this conception. For example, in applying the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review of agency
discretion, the courts do not substitute their own judgment regarding sound policy for those of the agency. Instead, they seek to promote a form of dialogic
rationality in the administrative process by requiring the agency to articulate
and justify its exercises of power by reference to legally relevant public norms
invoked by outside parties and the agency itself, and by examining the sufficiency of the agencies’ responses to the data, analysis, and comments submitted
by outside parties and the justifications that it gives for its policy choices.43

42. See id. at 1711-60; Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 636-43 (2000).
43. See BREYER & STEWART, supra note 38, at 415-88.
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III
“BOTTOM UP” APPROACHES TO
DEVELOPING A GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A global administrative law can also be created from the “bottom up”
through application of domestic administrative law to the decisions of three
types of global regulatory regimes—international treaty-based regimes, transnational regulatory networks, and horizontal arrangements for mutual recognition
and cooperative equivalence determinations. The U.S. model of administrative
law provides an example. One possibility is to apply U.S. administrative law
directly to decisions or other actions by global regulatory regimes. Another is
to apply administrative law disciplines to domestic implementation of global
regulatory norms. A third is to apply such disciplines to the participation by
U.S. administrative officials in the decisionmaking of global regulatory regimes.
A. Application of U.S. Administrative Law Directly to Actions of International Regulatory Regimes
As previously noted, global regulatory regimes generally do not have authority to determine or enforce requirements or liabilities directly against individuals or other non-state actors. But instances of such authority are likely to
grow as international regulation intensifies, as analogous experience with direct
regulation in the E.U. suggests. A current example is the Executive Board of
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol, which
determines whether energy or other projects to reduce greenhouse gases emissions that are undertaken by project sponsors in developing countries but financed by, among others, firms in developed countries are eligible to receive
commercially valuable GHG emissions reduction credits. If this and similar
market-based global regulatory systems are to succeed, they must provide investors with a degree of legal certainty, including timely resolution of disputes.
Although the determinations of the CDM Executive Board have vital consequences for project developers and investors, they are afforded no procedural
rights at the Board level and no opportunity for review of Board decisions by an
independent tribunal.44
Another example is the U.N. Security Council 1267 Committee, established
and authorized by the U.N. Security Council to list persons determined to be
engaged in financing international terrorism. The Security Council resolution
establishing the committee obligates U.N. member states to freeze the assets of
listed persons. There is no procedure available before the committee whereby
persons listed have the right to challenge the correctness of a listing, although
such persons listed have challenged domestic asset freezes implementing the
listings in domestic courts.45 As a third example, the U.N. High Commissioner
44. See Ernestine E. Meijer, The Clean Development Mechanism: Loss in a “Win-Win” Instrument
(unpublished article, on file with the author).
45. See David Dyzenhaus, The Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law, 68 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
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for Refugees (UNCR) makes determinations about refugee status of individuals without an established system of procedural rights for claimants and administers camps for refugees, who have complained of sexual abuse and other serious wrongdoing by UNCR employees and contractors, without an established
mechanism for redress.46
In the absence of any effective remedy at the level of the global regime, domestic courts in the United States and other countries might seek to review the
legality, procedural and/or substantive, of international regulatory and other
administrative decisions that directly affect specific persons. While the U.N.
and other international organizations and their officials regularly plead official
immunity when sued in domestic courts, if such organizations themselves fail to
provide effective accountability for seriously erroneous, arbitrary, or abusive
decisions or actions by their officials and employees, domestic courts might start
to chip away at immunity.47
If a claimant brought suit in a U.S. federal court, the boldest possibility
would be for courts to hold that the international regulatory regime is a de facto
federal agency to which effective decisionmaking power has been delegated by
treaty or otherwise, so that the procedural and other requirements of the APA
apply directly to that regime.48 Such a step would be so deeply inconsistent with
the reluctance of courts to intrude on the conduct by the Executive of foreign
affairs that it has no practical chance of adoption. Nonetheless, without relying
on the APA, federal courts could apply constitutional requirements of procedural due process and other generally applicable principles of administrative
law to review decisions of global authorities that directly and adversely affect
individual persons, and provide relief through injunctions and declaratory judgments.
Tort remedies are another possible mechanism of review and redress. Tort
claims have, for example, been asserted in India against asserted negligence by
UNICEF employees in the distribution and administration of vaccines, which
assertedly caused medical injuries to those receiving the vaccines.49

46. Mark Pallis, The Operation of UNHCR’s Accountability Mechanisms (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
47. Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT’L L. 103 (2002) (discussing recent moves by the United Nations to limit
the use of immunity when serious breach of law is alleged); Jennifer Murray, Note, Who Will Police the
Peace-Builders? The Failure to Establish Accountability for the Participation of United Nations Civilian
Police in the Trafficking of Women in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 475 (2003) (discussing the abuse of the immunity doctrine by U.N. personnel involved in peacekeeping missions).
48. A court would have to conclude that the global authority was an “agency” for purposes of the
APA, which defines “agency” as “each authority of the government of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. §
551(1) (2004).
49. UNICEF: Court Finds UNICEF and Government Responsible for Child Deaths in Assam,
ACR WEEKLY NEWSLETTER (Asia Human Rights Commission, Hong Kong, China), Nov. 12, 2003,
(on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at http://acr.hrschool.org/mainfile.php/0153/242/ (last
visited Apr. 7, 2005).
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If domestic courts began to review and provide remedies against decisions
of global regulatory regimes, the regimes would have strong incentives to develop effective internal systems of administrative law in order to defend or deter such initiatives. For example, athletes have brought domestic court actions
against anti-doping and other disciplinary decisions by international sports federations. In response, the sports federations have developed a fairly elaborate
system of procedural rights for athletes charged with wrongdoing and review by
an independent tribunal. Thus, “bottom up” review by domestic courts might
stimulate “top down” administrative law initiatives by global regimes.
B. Application of U.S. Administrative Law to Domestic Implementation of
International Regulatory Norms
Federal regulatory officials regularly serve on U.S. delegations to treatybased regimes, participate in transnational regulatory networks, or negotiate
mutual recognition arrangements. Subsequently, they implement the resulting
global regime norms and arrangements at the domestic level. For example, in
order to carry out their obligations under the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, federal agencies increasingly adopt international standards as the basis for food safety regulations.50 Alternatively, implementation
of global regulatory norms takes the form of enforcement or other adjudicatory
decisions in individual cases. For example, under international regulatory regimes of mutual recognition or equivalency, the FDA often decides whether to
authorize or take enforcement action against the import of a medical device
product that complies with domestic regulatory requirements in the exporting
state, based on a determination of whether those requirements are equivalent
to those in the United States.51
United States administrative officials thus have both an “external” and an
“internal” role; they are part of both national and global systems of regulatory
government.52 A critical issue is the extent to which procedural requirements
and judicial review of domestic implementation might reach back to consider
the development and basis of the global regulatory norms that are being implemented. The officials participating in the adoption of a global regulatory
50. David Livshiz, SPS, International Standards, Domestic Implementation, and Public Participation: Can the Stars Align? 7-8 (Jan. 2, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For examples see Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions and Importation of Commodities,
70 Fed. Reg. 460, 505-06 (Jan. 4, 2005) (justifying the risk assessment for the proposed regulation as
complying with the requirements demanded by the Codex and OIE); Bromoxynil, Diclofop-methyl,
Dicofol, Diquat, Etridiazole, et al.; Proposed Tolerance Actions, 69 Fed. Reg. 47051, 47055 (Aug. 4,
2004) (to be codified as 40 C.F.R. pt. 180) (justifying a change in regulations to make them compliant
with standards developed by Codex).
51. Livshiz, supra note 50, at 12-14. For examples see Australian Meat, supra note 9 (finding Australia’s system of meat inspection equivalent); Mutual Recognition of Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practice Inspection Reports, Medical Device Quality System Audit Reports, and Certain Medical Device Product Evaluation Reports Between the United States and the European Community, 63
Fed. Reg. 60122 (Nov. 6, 1998) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 26) (providing for mutual recognition of
good manufacturing practice (GMP) inspection reports for pharmaceuticals provided by signatory
countries).
52. SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 6, at 171-81.

112905 03_STEWART.DOC

Summer/Autumn 2005]

1/10/2006 10:23 AM

A MODEL FOR GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW?

79

norm will most likely be strongly committed to its implementation, and the justifications given by an agency for its domestic decision might be rationalizations
of a fait accompli. Unless the record considered by the court and the reasons
given by the agency encompass the global elements of decisionmaking, domestic administrative law might provide little in the way of meaningful accountability.
In addressing these issues, one should ask whether U.S. agency decisions
that implement international agreements should be subject to the same procedural requirements and principles regarding the availability and scope of judicial review as similar regulatory decisions that are purely domestic in character.
There are three possible answers to this question. Decisions implementing international agreements might be subject to the same requirements as purely
domestic decisions (“parity”). They might be subject to fewer requirements
(“parity minus”). Or, they might be subject to greater requirements (“parity
plus”).
1. The Paradigm of Parity
Subject to a limited statutory exception in the case of notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures, discussed below, nothing in the APA indicates that
domestic agency actions in implementing global norms are exempt from APA
requirements or subject to a lesser standard of judicial review than comparable
purely domestic decisions. While the APA provides wholesale exemptions
from all of its provisions for certain military functions,53 no similar exemptions
apply to agency actions relating to foreign affairs.
The paradigm of parity holds that agency decisions implementing global
regulatory norms should be subject to the same administrative law procedures,
requirements, and review on the same basis as equivalent, purely domestic
agency actions. There are a number of court decisions that reflect this approach: United States v. Decker,54 upholding, in the context of a criminal prosecution, the judicial reviewability of U.S. fishing regulations issued pursuant to
the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Convention; Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
United States,55 holding that U.S. agency suspension of countervailing subsidies
investigation pursuant to U.S.–Korean agreement is subject to notice and comment rulemaking; and, although subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court,
Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation,56 in which the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Department of Transportation was required to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and conduct a Clean Air Act conformity determination in issuing regulations that would permit Mexican motor
carriers to operate in the United States.

53. See 5 U.S.C § 551(F), (G) (2004).
54. 600 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1979).
55. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001).
56. 316 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d 541 U.S. 752 (2004). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court’s reasoning, see infra text accompanying note 82.
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Under a parity paradigm, some forms of agency implementation of international decisions will not be subject to procedural requirements or judicial review because equivalent, purely domestic decisions are not. For example, under the APA, an administrative decision whether to initiate enforcement proceedings in a given case is not judicially reviewable when relevant statutes (as is
generally the case) do not specify any requirements or criteria for such decisions; in such cases, enforcement decisions are deemed to have been “committed to agency discretion by law.”57 Thus, decisions by the FDA or USDA not to
take enforcement action against imported products in connection with international mutual recognition and other regulatory equivalence arrangements will
generally not be subject to judicial review unless the arrangement has been
formalized in a regulation or other measure that is legally binding on the agency
and the agency’s action is claimed to violate it.58 Similarly, agency guidance and
similar policy documents that do not purport to have the force of law are generally not subject to notice and comment rulemaking requirements or, in many
cases, to judicial review. Thus, agency use of such documents or other informal
means to implement global regulatory norms or cooperative arrangements will
likewise not be subject to those disciplines.
Further, under a parity paradigm, the facts and circumstances involved in
the development of the global regulatory norms that the agency is implementing and the agency’s role in their development might not be subject to review.
In reviewing agency rules, courts generally limit themselves to the record generated after rulemaking has been formally noticed and initiated by the agency.
Prior informal discussions between the agency and interested persons, which
might play a decisive role in shaping the proposed and final rule, are generally
not part of the relevant record before the court and are thus not considered by
it.59 Similarly, the informal background of licensing or enforcement decisions by
agencies is generally not accessible or considered on judicial review. Given this
precedent, courts following a paradigm of parity might very well refuse to delve
into global events that occurred before the initiation of domestic decisionmaking processes by the agency, leaving out what is often the most crucial part.
The parity paradigm is also restricted by the APA provision exempting
“foreign affairs functions” from the notice and comment procedures otherwise
applicable to rulemaking and the trial-type hearing requirements otherwise applicable to formal adjudication.60 The legislative background indicates that this
exemption should be limited to those matters that “so affect relations with
other governments that, for example, public [agency decisionmaking processes]

57. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2004); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
58. When the decision is to enforce, the importer, of course, will generally have a right of review
on the merits but not of the decision to take the enforcement action as such.
59. Home Box Office Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that contacts received
prior to the issuance of formal notice of proposed rulemaking need not necessarily be disclosed).
60. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(1), 554(a)(4) (2004).
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would clearly provoke undesirable international consequences.”61 Courts have
nonetheless tended to interpret it fairly broadly to cover the implementation of
international economic and regulatory agreements.62 But in the Uruguay
Round Agreement Act, Congress restored parity in the specific, politically salient context of agency responses to decisions by the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body finding U.S. regulations to be contrary to WTO Uruguay Round Agreements. Before modifying such a regulation, the relevant agency must provide
public notice and opportunity for comment and justify any change in relation to
the comments received. In addition, the USTR must consult with specified congressional committees and obtain the views of relevant private sector advisory
committees.63
2. The Paradigm of Parity Minus
This approach holds that domestic administrative decisions should not be
subject to the same procedural requirements or to the same availability and
scope of judicial review as purely domestic decisions. Its rationale is that excessive legalization and procedural formality will compromise confidentiality in
international negotiations and otherwise impair the ability of the executive to
conclude and promptly implement international agreements. Prompt and efficient implementation is necessary to secure the credibility of the executive in
international negotiations. Also, opportunities for delay through procedural
formalities or judicial review will enable domestic economic interests to block
or delay implementation of international agreements that benefit the country
and impair cooperative relations with other nations. Since the executive can, as
a general matter, conduct and conclude international agreements without being
subject to the constraints of domestic administrative law, it should also enjoy
significant flexibility when taking the domestic steps necessary to implement
these agreements.
This paradigm finds support in a number of court decisions. For example, in
Jensen v. National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA),64 the Ninth Circuit held
that a challenge by U.S. fishing boats to regulations issued by the International
Pacific Halibut Commission and approved by the Secretary of State (who was
delegated such authority by the President) were not subject to judicial review
on the ground that presidential action in the field of foreign affairs is committed
to agency discretion by law.65 Similarly, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
61. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, 26
(1947)
(on
file
with
Law
&
Contemp.
Probs.),
available
at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/apa/refrnc/agtc.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
62. See C. Jeffrey Tribbels, Delineating the Foreign Affairs Function in the Age of Globalization, 23
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV 389, 395-97 (1999).
63. See 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g)(1) (2004).
64. 512 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1975).
65. The court invoked Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 333 U.S. 103 (1948),
which held that determinations by the CAB and the President’s determination of international airline
route service authorizations and recommendations by the CAB regarding such awards were not subject
to judicial review. Id. at 1190; see also Z. & F. Assets Realization Co. v. Hull, 311 U.S. 470 (1941)
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v. Pena66 invoked the “foreign affairs function” exemption in the APA rulemaking provisions to reject a claim by U.S. truck drivers that the Department of
Transportation was required to follow notice and comment procedures in issuing regulations authorizing Mexican truck drivers to drive in the United States
based on driver licensing equivalency. The court’s ruling might well have been
influenced by a perception that liberalization in trade and services is generally
beneficial and by a reluctance to provide opponents with procedural weapons
to fight it.67
The paradigm of “parity minus” is also reflected in Public Citizen v. United
States Trade Representative (USTR),68 holding that USTR was not required to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the negotiation of NAFTA on
the ground that there would be no final agency action unless and until the negotiations were successfully concluded. At that point, the agreement would be
submitted by the President to Congress for approval, an action that is also not
subject to judicial review, with the result that judicial review is not available at
any stage. Likewise, Public Citizen v. Kantor held that the USTR’s negotiation
of the GATT Uruguay Round was not subject to judicial review under the
APA.69 And in Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation (DOT),70 the Supreme Court held that in issuing regulations implementing NAFTA and relevant federal statutes to authorize operation of Mexican trucks in the United
States, DOT was not required to conduct an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) and make a Clean Air Act conformity determination. The Court reasoned that the combination of NAFTA obligations and relevant federal statutes
left DOT with no choice but to grant the authorization; hence an EIS and a conformity determination were unnecessary. This decision makes clear how global
regulatory norms can short-circuit otherwise applicable domestic administrative
law processes.
3. The Paradigm of Parity Plus
A third approach would subject domestic administrative decisions implementing international regulatory norms to more demanding administrative law
discipline than equivalent purely domestic actions. The basic justification
would be that the norms being implemented were chosen through global decisionmaking processes that are more remote, opaque, and closed than equivalent, purely domestic processes and therefore less subject to political and other
mechanisms of accountability, justifying more demanding accountability
through administrative law as a compensating corrective.71 Thus, global regula(holding that decisions by Secretaries of Treasury and State to certify awards pursuant to determinations of U.S.-German Mixed Claims Commission are not subject to judicial review).
66. 17 F.3d 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
67. See Judith L. Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic
Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603 (2000); Benvenisti, supra note 30.
68. 976 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
69. 864 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1994).
70. 541 U.S. 752 (2004).
71. See Wirth, supra note 14.
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tory decisionmaking often occurs in distant locations such as Basel or Geneva.
Transnational “club” mechanisms in global regulatory regimes make it very difficult for concerned interests in the United States, and especially for less wellorganized consumer, environmental, and other “public” interests, to acquire the
information and to organize effectively in order to influence such decisions.
Also, U.S. administrative officials may use informal negotiations and coordinated regulatory policy initiatives with regulators in other countries to enhance
their own independence from otherwise applicable U.S. domestic political
checks.72
How might “parity plus” be implemented within the scope of the procedural
and judicial review requirements of the APA in order to offset these systemic
factors? A key objective would be to enhance the transparency of the facts,
analyses, and considerations that underlie global regulatory decisions in order
to expose them to public scrutiny and contestation and to enable courts to apply
requirements of reasoned justification, based on an adequate record, for the
regulatory choices made.73 The operating premise is that open deliberations and
transparency tend to “level the playing field,” alleviate information asymmetries, and check the influence of narrow interest groups in favor of broader but
less well-organized constituencies.74
In order to implement “parity plus,” procedural requirements and judicial
review would be directed not only at a federal agency’s implementation of the
global norm, but would extend to the norm itself and the process of its adoption, even in cases in which analogous earlier stage agency decisionmaking in
the purely domestic context would not be subject to such disciplines. Thus, in
cases in which domestic implementation involves formal adjudication or notice
and comment rulemaking, courts might require the agency to submit for the
record evidentiary materials on the global decisionmaking and its stated reasons
why the international norms in question were adopted. The agency might be
required to explain why the relevant agency officials agreed, in their “external”
capacity as participants in the global decisional process, to the norms adopted
and what commitments they made regarding domestic U.S. implementation.
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) might also be used to obtain discovery of agency records relevant to the international negotiations.75 The justification for these steps would be that they are necessary in order for a court adequately to review the agency’s domestic decision by enabling it to take into ac72. See Zaring, supra note 6.
73. The extent of need for such measures will presumably vary depending on the extent of transparency and accessibility of the international regulatory regime, including whether it is a network or
more formal treaty-based regime; these variations may influence the degree of intrusiveness in courts’
application of hard look review.
74. Benvenisti, supra note 30, at 323-24.
75. FOIA provides a “deliberative privilege” exemption that might be invoked by the government
to withhold records pertaining to global regulatory matters from disclosure. It also provides an exemption for matters that are “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy” and properly classified under that order. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (5) (2004).
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count the underlying global norms, circumstances, and considerations. Also,
the enhanced transparency resulting from such steps could energize legislative
and other political oversight. The government, of course, would strongly resist
any such initiative as an unwarranted interference with the Executive’s conduct
of foreign relations and with needed informality and confidentiality in international negotiations.
A parity plus approach would reject the limitations on the availability of judicial review and agency procedures adopted by the courts following a parity
minus approach, and the scope of review would extend significantly beyond that
applied by courts under a parity paradigm. In many cases doctrines of reviewability and ripeness would have to be relaxed in order for a court to undertake
review of the global components of agency decisions. No court has yet taken
this path. But the ever-increasing importance of global regulation, growing
criticism of both the procedural and substantive elements of global regulatory
decisionmaking, and the concomitant erosion of domestic political and legal
mechanisms of accountability might well lead the courts to take the initiative,
much as they did in the 1960s in response to similar criticisms of domestic regulatory decisionmaking.
C. Extending U.S. Administrative Law to U.S. Participation in International
Regulatory Regime Decisionmaking
A potential supplement or alternative to the steps outlined above would be
to extend federal administrative law disciplines directly to agency officials’ participation in global regulatory decisionmaking, whether through treaty-based
regimes, regulatory networks, or transnational cooperation regarding mutual
recognition or regulatory equivalency. Even an ambitious approach to judicial
review of domestic implementation of global regulatory norms would not allow
the public to have notice of, to comment on, or to have an opportunity to participate or influence the decisional process at the global level where the controlling decisions are often made.76
One possibility for achieving this goal would be for courts to treat federal
agency officials participating in international regulatory decisionmaking as an
agency for APA purposes and to hold that they are therefore subject to APA
procedural requirements and judicial review with respect to such participation.
The APA and general principles of federal administrative law, however, afford
little or no purchase for such an initiative. Judicial deference to the Executive’s
conduct of foreign affairs is a major additional obstacle. Thus, as previously
discussed, federal administrative agencies have great latitude to consult informally with other governmental or private parties and develop rulemaking options and proposals before undertaking the public comment process. Similar
76. Federal agencies entering into international regulatory agreements with counterparts must
clear these agreements with the State Department and notify Congress pursuant to the Case-Zablocki
Act, but this notification occurs only after the agreement has been concluded. See Horton, supra note
10, at 713.
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principles apply to agency licensing and enforcement decisions. Furthermore,
APA law would normally fail to provide a basis for obtaining immediate judicial review of an agency’s international-level decision to agree to a regulatory
norm. Even if informal agreement by high agency officials to an international
norm were regarded as an agency decision, litigants could generally not satisfy
requirements of standing and ripeness prior to adoption of a domestic implementing measure that adversely affects them.
Accordingly, new statutes or executive initiatives would be needed in order
to extend domestic administrative law disciplines to agency participation in international regulatory decisionmaking. Although there is little prospect of extending judicial review directly to global regulatory decisions, procedural requirements for agency participation in international regulatory negotiations
have already been adopted in certain instances, including the following:
1. Notice and Opportunity for Comment in Advance of Agency Participation in International Regulatory Negotiations
The FDA and USDA are subject to a statutory requirement to notify the
public about international “sanitary or phytosanitary standards under consideration or planned for consideration.”77 Other agencies, including the USTR
and the Department of Commerce, have from time to time, as a matter of
agency practice, likewise provided public notice of international regulatory
harmonization activities.78 These opportunities for public input into the U.S.
position in international regulatory negotiations often include public meetings
at which participants are informed of the U.S. negotiating position and provide
comments to agency officials.79 Thus, before entering into active negotiations
on the Montreal Protocol, the Department of State and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a detailed program in the Federal Register
and invited public comments. They also issued an environmental impact statement.80 The executive branch also provided Federal Register notice of its intent
to negotiate NAFTA and held public hearings.81 It did not, however, issue a
environmental impact statement.
In the aftermath of unsuccessful efforts by NGOs to judicially challenge the
failure of the federal government to prepare environmental impact statements
on the negotiation of the NAFTA and Uruguay Round agreements,82 President
Clinton issued Executive Order 13,141 which directs the USTR to prepare an
environmental review for the negotiation of comprehensive multilateral trade
rounds, bilateral or plurilateral free trade agreements, and trade agreements in
natural resource sectors. The scope of such reviews was expanded in the Bipar77. 19 U.S.C. § 2578(c)(1) (2004).
78. See Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, supra note 21, at 443-44.
79. See Livshiz, supra note 50, at 15.
80. Wirth, supra note 14, at 25.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916 (1992), discussed supra text
accompanying note 56.
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tisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, which requires similar reviews of
the impact of trade agreements on U.S. employment and labor markets.83
2. Participation of NGO and Business Representatives in International
Negotiations
Non-governmental representatives, including representatives of business
and NGOs, are often included as members of the U.S. delegation to international regulatory regime negotiations, including those at the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Codex Alimentarius Commission.84 They might also participate by virtue of membership on
USTR advisory committees.85 Additionally, the Transatlantic Business and
Consumer dialogues, established as part of the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda,
have provided businesses and NGOs with opportunities to consult with government negotiators on issues of transatlantic policymaking.86
3. Measures to Provide Negotiation Transparency
The EPA has freely made OECD documentation available to nongovernmental representatives participating in U.S. delegations to the regulatory
harmonization negotiations held by the OECD Chemicals Group, notwithstanding the “restricted” status of the documents; this practice has, however,
not been applied to other aspects of OECD’s work in regulatory harmonization.87
The application of these various types of measures is uneven, and there is no
consistent overall federal government policy or practice. Moreover, they are
generally limited to international negotiations in the context of treaty-based
regimes and have little or no application to more informal regulatory networks
and cooperative arrangements regarding mutual recognition and equivalency.
Non-governmental actors, and especially NGOs, often find that the opportunities for participation have limited value. Often the issues presented are highly
technical. As a result, many NGOs lack the capacity to participate effectively,
which helps to explain the low levels of NGO attendance at meetings and of
83. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(c) (2004). Nevertheless, it is not immediately clear what impact such new
measures will have, particularly since neither the congressional legislation nor the executive order provides for judicial review and since the executive order explicitly disallows it. Exec. Order No. 13141, 64
Fed. Reg. 63169, 63170 (Nov. 16, 1999). The American Bar Association has recognized the need for
additional steps to provide greater transparency in connection with international negotiations on regulatory harmonization and has recommended that the President encourage federal agencies to provide
notice and opportunity for comment with respect to negotiation activities, to establish advisory committees in connection with such negotiations, and to make documents available under FOIA with respect
to each significant international regulatory harmonization activity in which it is engaged.
84. See, e.g., International Standard-Setting Activities, Codex Alimentarius Commission; Duties of
United States Delegates and Delegation Members Including Non-Government Members, 63 Fed. Reg.
7118 (Feb. 12, 1998).
85. See Wirth, supra note 14, at 25.
86. See TRAN. ATL. BUS. DIALOGUE, ABOUT THE TABD, available at http://www.tabd.com/about;
TRAN. ATL. CONSUMER DIALOGUE, ABOUT TACD (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at
http://www.tacd.org/about/about.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
87. See Wirth, supra note 14, at 25.
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submitted comments on U.S. negotiating positions.88 NGOs also tend to view
the meetings and other procedural opportunities such as notice and opportunity
for comment as cosmetic in character. This view might be changed if agency
officials were required to respond to the comments submitted andpublicly justify the negotiating positions that they ultimately take. However, the statutory
and executive iniatitives described above do not impose such requirements.
Also, business and union groups enjoy preferential or disproportionate access to some international negotiations by virtue of their membership on agency
advisory committees.89 Often there might be one representative for each industry while consumer groups are left with a single representative. The costs of
traveling to and participating in distant fora is also a barrier for many NGOs.
Even when nongovernmental actors are members of delegations or have other
participation opportunities, they could be effectively shut out of high level negotiations between principals or otherwise marginalized.90
Notwithstanding their limitations, wide adoption of such measures could
have a significant effect in promoting transparency with respect to U.S. federal
agencies’ participation in global regulatory decisionmaking. They could also be
expected to have an influence on subsequent judicial review of domestic implementing measures by providing potential litigants with additional information and insight regarding the global regulatory background and facilitating expansion of the administrative record and the range of factors considered by reviewing courts. It is, of course, quite possible that non-state actors based in
other countries could seek to take advantage of these measures, including opportunity for comment and subsequent judicial review.91 That could be an important first step in the development of a genuinely cosmopolitan administrative law.
The limitations of such efforts in dealing with the more informal modes of
global regulatory decisionmaking must, however, be emphasized. Extension of
U.S. administrative law to U.S. officials’ participation in global regulatory decisionmaking might be strongly resisted by other nations. They might fear that
such initiatives would undermine the informality, confidentiality, and efficiency
of international negotiations, and enhance U.S. leverage in international negotiations. Developing countries might fear that such measures would provide
additional and unwelcome influence for northern NGOs.

88. See Livshiz, supra note 50, at 20.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Press Release, Trans Atl. Consumer Dialogue, U.S.—EU Summit Puts Business
CEOs Ahead of Consumer Groups (June 23, 2004) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at
http://www.tacd.org/press/?id=39 (last visited Mar. 21, 2005) (announcing a boycott of a summit of the
Transatlantic Economic Partnership by TACD when business groups were offered a meeting with
Presidents of the United States and the European Council, but consumer groups were denied a similar
meeting).
91. Cf. Cable & Wireless P.L.C. v. FCC, 166 F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir 1999) (entertaining but rejecting
on the merits a claim by foreign telecommunications carrier that FCC regulations implementing as
WTO agreement had legally impermissible extraterritorial effects on foreign carriers).
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On the other hand, such initiatives, especially if matched by similar initiatives from the E.U. and other major jurisdictions, could prod the adoption by
global regulatory regimes of administrative law mechanisms in order to preempt, fend off, or manage the impact of different, uncoordinated domestic administrative law requirements, as suggested by the experience with international sports federations discussed previously.
IV
“TOP DOWN” APPROACHES TO
DEVELOPMENT OF GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
An alternative to “bottom up” is to construct new administrative law
mechanisms directly at the level of global regulatory regimes. Fully implementing a U.S.-style system of administrative law through such a “top down” approach would require global institutional structures with distinct legislative,
administrative, and independent reviewing bodies. Such a structure involves a
considerably higher degree of institutional differentiation and legalization than
currently exists. It might also require substantial precision in legal norms that
are binding within the regime.92 A few treaty-based regimes exhibit these characteristics, but most do not. Regulatory networks are typically not characterized by significant institutional differentiation, although some network regimes
have developed committee structures and may evolve further.93 Arrangements
among national regulators for mutual recognition and other forms of equivalency cooperation among national regulators generally do not involve any distinct transnational institutional structures. Accordingly, the development of a
global administrative law resembling the U.S. model will ultimately depend on
whether there is considerable further development of institutional differentiation and legalization in global regulatory regimes. If informal regulatory networks or horizontal methods of regulatory cooperation have advantages that
enable them to acquire a greater role in global regulation than more legalized
treaty-based or network regimes,94 the development of global administrative law
might be correspondingly hindered.
A. Types of Global Regulatory Regime Structures
A number of treaty-based regulatory regimes are institutionally differentiated and relatively highly legalized. 95 The administrative and reviewing compo92. For discussion of delegation, precision, and binding quality as the defining characteristics of
legalization of international regimes, see Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54
INT’L ORG. 401 (2000).
93. See David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 U.
CHI. INT’L L.J. 17-19 (2005). For example, the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(“ISOCO”) has a fairly well-developed committee structure. See http://www.iosco.org/about/
about.cfm?whereami=page2 (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
94. SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 6, at 171-94 (discussing the advantages offered by informal networks of regulators).
95. I am grateful to Ernestine Meijer for identifying and summarizing many of the regimes discussed in this subsection.
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nents and functions in such regimes can be conceptualized in more than one
way, with varying implications for the current states and for future development
of administrative law at the global regime level.
1. International Treaty-Based Regimes that Directly Regulate Non-State
Actors
Only a few international regimes currently exercise direct regulatory authority over non-state actors through the decisions of administrative bodies exercising regulatory authority. One example is the CDM Executive Board, which
determines the eligibility of projects under the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) and the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction credits to which
they are entitled. Another is the Security Council’s 1267 Committee listing decisions.96 A third is the determination by UNCHR of individuals’ refugee status.
At present, none of these regimes provides affected persons with procedural
rights similar to those afforded under domestic administrative law in the U.S. or
many other nations, and none provides for review by an independent tribunal
of the administrative decisions in question. The intensification of international
regulation is likely to result in more regimes exercising direct administrative
regulatory authority over non-state actors, which will increase pressures for the
development of procedural and reviewing mechanisms to protect the rights and
interests of those regulated.
2. International Treaty-Based Regimes that Regulate through Member
State Compliance or Implementation
In most cases, the regulatory norms adopted by international regimes are
implemented through member state laws and administrative decisions that are
in turn applied to domestic non-state actors. There are several different ways of
conceptualizing the applicability of administrative law disciplines to such an arrangement. In one conceptualization, the individual member states are the
regulated entities. In another, the regulated entities are the domestic non-state
actors, and the individual member states are the administrative bodies responsible for implementing the global regulatory program through controls on the
non-state actors. Some international regulatory regimes, including a number of
international human rights regimes and the IMF and World Bank, are aimed
exclusively or primarily at the conduct of states. But many other international
regulatory regimes are aimed at both the conduct of states and the conduct of
non-state actors. They can be analyzed under either conception. The discussion that follows provides examples of the application of each conception, including a number of regimes discussed under both.
a. States as the regulated entities. Under this conception, the legislative
body is the group of states that ratify the regime treaty, which is the legislation
for the regime and binds states that are parties. The regulated entities are the
96. Although member states must implement freezes of listed persons’ assets, implementation in
many states is automatic, making the effective impact of committee listing decisions direct.
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individual state parties responsible for implementing the norms thus adopted.
In order to develop a U.S.-style administrative law under this conceptualization,
the regime would have to include not only the legislative body, but a distinct
administrative body with the power to adopt or apply regime norms that are
binding on member states. In addition, it would have to have a distinct independent reviewing body that determines the conformance of the decisions of
the administrative body with the regime’s legislative norms, including both substantive and procedural requirements.97 A substantial number of regimes have
two out of these three bodies, but only a few have all three.
(1) Regimes with independent, norm-generating administrative bodies
(a)
Adoption of subsidiary regulatory norms by a majority of
regime state parties. Muddying the distinction between legislative and administrative is the circumstance that in many regimes the COP, besides being the official legislative body responsible for the treaty and amendments to it, fulfills
functions that can, in the context of international law, be regarded as administrative in character because it involves the creation of subsidiary norms without
following the procedures, such as ratification, required for treaty law. In some
cases, states that are members of treaty-based international organizations fulfill
this role as well. For example, under the London Convention,98 the Bonn Convention,99 the Basel Convention,100 and CITES,101 the COP has the power to
amend, by majority decision, annexes to the treaties that specify in greater detail the regulatory obligations of parties. Unlike amendment to the treaties,
these annex amendments do not need ratification of the parties in order to enter into force.102
Under the Montreal Protocol, the Meeting of the Parties (MOP), operating
by two-thirds majority vote, has the authority to modify the Protocol’s regulatory requirements, which are binding on Parties.103 For example, “adjust97. These administrative bodies act on the basis of powers conferred to them and on the basis of
procedural rules adopted by legislative bodies authorizing them to create, extinguish, modify and apply
primary rules that establish the substantive norms of conduct required of the regulated entities. The
distinction between primary and secondary rules is developed in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
(1994); see also Kenneth W. Abbott et al., supra note 92.
98. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,
Dec. 29, 1972, art. 15, para. 2, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120. For reasons noted above, some of the
regimes discussed in this subsection can also be fruitfully analyzed under the alternative conception,
which regards states as administrative agencies and non-state actors as the regulated entities; this conception is discussed infra, Section IV.2.
99. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 23, 1979, art. 11,
1990 U.K.T.S. No. 87.
100. Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, art. 18, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-5 (1991), 28 I.L.M. 657.
101. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3,
1973, art. 15, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
102. State Parties having objections to the amendments can generally make reservations to them.
Not making objections is considered as consent.
103. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 19, 1987, art. 2, paras.
9(c), 10(b), S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 293.
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ments”104 made to the Protocol by the MOP in 1990 and 1992 determined that
production and consumption of CFCs should be phased out completely by 1996.
Similar far-reaching changes have subsequently been adopted for regulation of
other ozone-depleting substances listed in the various annexes to the Protocol.105
Similarly, a majority of the states that are members of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) can modify regulatory requirements that are
binding on all members under the Chicago Convention on International Civil
Aviation.106 Amendment procedures like those found in the Montreal Protocol
and ICAO generally deal with subjects considered technical in nature or that
require frequent adjustment of regulatory norms due to changes in information
and circumstance (or both). Such measures, however, often have major practical consequences.
In the Bretton Woods organizations, the member states or their representatives can act by other than unanimous vote to modify otherwise applicable
treaty norms or adopt binding subsidiary norms. Thus, three-quarters of the
WTO member states can grant, for a limited term, exemptions from the disciplines of WTO Agreements.107 The World Bank and the IMF generate subsidiary regulatory norms through decisions by representatives of member nations—
the Bank’s Board of Directors and the IMF’s Managing Directors—who decide
through a system of weighted voting based on the member states’ financial contributions. Another example is the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which
consists of representatives of Member Nations and Associate Members of FAO
or WHO.108 Acting by majority vote, the Commission issues food standards to
protect consumer health and to ensure fair business practices. The procedure
for adopting standards includes an extensive role for expert committees.
(b)
Adoption of binding subsidiary norms by purely administrative bodies. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Executive Board
Protocol is an example of a treaty regime authority that more closely approximates the domestic law conception of an administrative body.109 The Board engages in subsidiary lawmaking through both rulemaking and adjudication. It
104. Id., art. 2, para. 9.
105. Unlike the London, Bonn, Basel and CITES Conventions, these “adjustments” are binding to
the State parties to the Protocol, without a possibility to object to them. See Robin R. Churchill & Geir
Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little
Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 623 (2000).
106. Convention on International Civil Aviation, December 7, 1944, art. 90 juncto art. 54(l), 61 Stat.
1180; T.I.A.S. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
107. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994), Art. IX (3).
108. Established by a resolution of the Food and Agriculture Organization (Eleventh Session of the
Conference of FAO in 1961) and a resolution of the World Health Organization (Sixteenth World
Health Assembly in 1963). See “The Codex system: FAO, WHO and the Codex Alimentarius
Commission” (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs., available at http://www.fao.org/documents/
show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/w9114e/W9114e04.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
109. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11,
1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add. 1, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (entered into force February 16, 2005), art. 12.
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approves the methodologies used in specific CDM projects, takes decisions on
accreditation of CDM operational entities, decides on the registration of a project under CDM and on the issuance of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)
for projects.110 These decisions not only have binding consequences for participating states but also for private parties, as discussed above.
Another example of a purely administrative body exercising legally binding
authority is provided by the Office International des Epizooties (OIE), an international regulatory organization concerned with animal diseases and their
spread and responsible for issuing and administering the Animal Health Code.
The OIE is governed by an International Committee, composed of technical
representatives appointed by each of the participating States.111 The OIE has
specialist Commissions on a number of animal diseases, among which is the
OIE Foot and Mouth Disease and Other Epizootics Commission, composed of
six experts.112 This Commission makes the initial decision to grant a country a
“foot and mouth disease (FMD) free” status,113 although its decision has to be
ratified by the International Committee. Such decisions have enormous consequences for a country’s trade in animals and animal products.
The administrative managements of the World Bank and the IMF adopt,
impose, and police conditions on loans and other forms of financial assistance
to member states that have important regulatory impacts on those states. These
country-specific conditions are in principle legally enforceable by the Bank and
Fund. The Bank has also adopted guidelines relating to environmental and social issues that apply to all grants; compliance with these conditions is subject to
review by the Bank’s Inspection Panel.
Similarly, the listing of persons determined to be financing international terrorism by the U.N. Security Council 1267 Committee is another example of an
administrative body whose decisions have binding authority. U.N. member
states are obligated to freeze the assets of persons listed and take other specified steps to assist the work of the committee. In this case, the administrative
decisions effectively bind listed individuals as well as member states. Similarly,
the UNHCR’s adjudication of individuals’ refugee status has legally binding
implications for U.N. member states’ treatment of such individuals as well as
the individuals.
(c)
Other administrative bodies. In addition, a number of
treaty-based regimes have subsidiary bodies that develop detailed procedures
110. Articles 5, 36, and 65 of the CDM Modalities and Procedures. See Report of the Conference of
the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh, 29 October to 10 November 2001, Addendum,
Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21,
2002) [hereinafter Conference Report].
111. Organic Statutes of the Office International des Epizooties (“OIE”), art. 6 (appendix to the
International Agreement establishing the OIE, January 25, 1924).
112. Established on the basis of the General Rules of the OIE, May 24, 1973, art. 18.
113. The different categories of “disease free” are laid down in the Animal Health Code, ch. 2.1.1
(on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/
en_chapitre_2.1.1.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
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and protocols for implementing international regulatory treaties, which are not
legally binding as such, but are either subsequently adopted as binding by the
COP or function as non-binding but highly influential guidance for implementation by member states. These institutions represent an intermediate stage of
institutional differentiation that might eventually ripen into authority to adopt
binding norms.114 Examples of such institutions are the Methodology Panel and
the Accreditation Panel established by the CDM Executive Board,115 the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body
for Implementation under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change,116 and the Scientific Council of the Bonn Convention on migratory species.117
(2) Regimes with reviewing bodies but no administrative bodies. Although in form a system of tribunals for resolving controversies between states,
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, and especially its Appellate Body, increasingly function as a regulatory administrative body with the aim of constructing a
fully articulated trade regulatory system and supervising its implementation by
member states.118 The Appellate Body’s hesitant provision for amicus briefs
submitted by non-state actors in order to obtain information and views of nonstate actors within the trade regulatory regime,119 and its development of administrative law requirements for member state implementation of WTO agreements,120 reflect this function.
Other prominent examples of regimes with strong reviewing tribunals in this
category can be found in human rights treaties with an individual complaints
clause. Under these treaties, individuals subject to actions of member state can
obtain review of those actions by international tribunals with the power to determine whether they comply with regime norms. The European Convention
on Human Rights, for example, authorizes the European Court on Human
Rights to make decisions, binding on member states, on behalf of any person,
non-governmental organization, or group of individuals claiming to be the vic114. In respect of the role of science, see also Note, The CITES Fort Lauderdale Criteria: The Uses
and Limits of Science in International Conservation Decision Making, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (2001).
115. Pursuant to Article 18 of the CDM Modalities and Procedures. See Conference Report, supra
note 110.
116. Framework Convention on Climate Change, concluded May 29, 1992, art. 10, U.N. Doc. No.
A/AC.237/18(Part II)/Add.1, 31 I.L.M. 849. Both technical bodies play a role in reviewing the reports
submitted by Annex I Member Parties under Article 12 of the Convention. Id.
117. Article VIII of the Bonn Convention, supra note 99.
118. See John T. Soma & Eric K. Wiengarten, Multinational Economic Network Effects and the
Need for an International Antitrust Response from the World Trade Organization: A Case Study in
Broadcast-Media and News Corporation, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 41, 127 (2000) (referring to the
WTO as an “international trade regulatory body” that is embodied in the authority given to the dispute
resolution mechanism).
119. WTO Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (98-000), para. 9 (Oct. 12, 1998).
120. See Sabino Cassese, Global Standards For National Administrative Procedure, 68 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (Summer/Autumn 2005); Giacinto della Cananea, Beyond the State: the Europeanization and Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, 9 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 563
(2003).
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tim of a violation of one of the human rights in the Convention or the protocols
thereto.121 The court’s decisions have profoundly important regulatory impacts
on the practices of member states and, in many cases, of business firms and
other private actors regulated by those states.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has an optional
protocol122 under which a State allows the Human Rights Committee to consider
complaints of individuals under its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by that State of one or more of the rights set forth in the Covenant. A
total of 104 States have ratified this optional protocol.123 The recommendations
of the Committee are not binding on the State Party but may have normative
force. Similar provisions on individual complaints exist under the Convention
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination124 and the Convention against Torture.125 A somewhat different approach to reviewing member state compliance
with an international human rights regime is found in the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights. Aggrieved individuals or groups must first apply to an administrative body, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, which is
the sole body that can bring claims before the Court. The Commission investigates applications and has discretion to decide which claims to prosecute before
the Court. Decisions are binding on states that have ratified the convention.
Another important example of independent review of non-compliance by
State Parties is the investor protection provisions of NAFTA’s Chapter 11,
which authorize investors of a NAFTA Party to bring claims before arbitral tribunals against another NAFTA Party asserting violations of NAFTA’s Chapter 11, Part A (including provisions on national treatment of investors).126 Tribunal decisions are binding on the parties and enforceable within the domestic
legal context of the State Party against whom the claim was brought.127 Similar
arrangements are provided in many bilateral treaties. These decisions will have
increasingly important impacts on domestic regulation and administrative law.
(3) Regimes with both administrative and reviewing bodies. Separate
independent regime bodies with authority to review the decisions of subsidiary
norm-generating administrative bodies within the same regime have emerged
121. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 34, 46, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, E.T.S. 5, amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S.
45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, and Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. 118.
122. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966.
123. See United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights report “Status of ratifications of the
principal international human rights treaties” (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
124. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res.
2106 (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 14, art. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
125. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 22, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113.
126. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, arts. 1102-1106, 1110, 32 I.L.M.642
[hereinafter NAFTA]. See generally GREENING NAFTA, THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (David L. Markell & John Knox eds., 2003).
127. Id., art. 1135, para 1.
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only recently. There are only a few examples of such arrangements, but their
number might grow with the intensification of global regulation and demands
by affected non-state actors for administrative law protections and methods for
securing greater accountability for the decision of global regulatory administrative bodies.
The most notable example is the World Bank Inspection Panel, which reviews whether Bank-funded projects conform to the Bank’s environmental and
social guidelines.128 Originally adopted as a technique of control by the Board of
Executive Directors of the Bank’s management and as a tool of internal administration, the Panel mechanism has developed into a more or less independent reviewing forum that can be invoked by NGOs and other non-governmental
actors. In a formal sense, the Panel’s powers are limited. It needs Bank authorization to investigate a case, and its findings and recommendations are not
binding. However, the Panel report, the management’s recommendations, and
the Board’s decision must be made publicly known. These circumstances can
generate strong pressures for the Bank’s management and Board to follow the
Panel’s recommendations.129 The International Finance Corporation has considered the adoption of a similar system.130
A second example of an independent body reviewing decisions of subsidiary
administrative decisionmaking entities is the Seabed Disputes Chamber (SDC)
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).131 The SDC has
jurisdiction with respect to different types of seabed-related disputes involving
various parties, including states, state enterprises, and private firms and individuals. In these disputes, the SDC applies the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); other international law compatible with
UNCLOS; rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority adopted in accordance with UNCLOS; and the terms of contracts concerning activities in the
area in matters relating to those contracts. Its decisions are binding and domestically enforceable.132
b. Individual member states as implementing administrative agencies;
non-state actors as regulated entities. An alternative conceptualization of global
regulatory regimes with a relatively high degree of institutional differentiation
128. See generally DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL-SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD
BANK INSPECTION PANEL (Dana Clark, Jonathan Fox & Kay Treakle eds., 2003) [hereinafter
DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY]; David Hunter, Using the World Bank Inspection Panel to Defend the
Interests of Project-affected People, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 201 (2003); Ellen Hey, The World Bank Inspection
Panel: Towards the Recognition of a New Legally Relevant Relationship, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y
SYMPOSIUM 61 (1997).
129. DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 128, at 178-82.
130. INT’L FIN. CORP., COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN, 2004 (on file with Law & Contemp.
Probs.), available at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
131. Bernard H. Oxman, Complementary Agreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction, 95 AM. J. INT’L
L. 277, 287-88 (2001). See generally on UNCLOS, ITLOS and jurisdiction, John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109 (1998).
132. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 293, 33, 39, 1833 U.N.T.S. 387, reprinted
in 21 I.L.M. 1261.
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and legalization is that the regime member states collectively compromise the
legislative body, the members states individually are the administrative bodies
responsible for implementing regime norms, the firms and other nongovernmental entities subject to regulation by member states are the regulated
entities, and the regime dispute settlement tribunal is the reviewing body that
determines compliance with regime norms by the implementing member states,
regarded as administrative bodies.
This model can be applied to regimes, like the WTO, that lack a regimelevel administrative body but have strong regime-level tribunals and that aim to
establish a sound regulatory system for private market actors. But it can also be
applied to regimes, like the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM, that also have regime-level
administrative bodies. Such regimes accordingly have a two-level administrative structure, including both a regime-level body like the Executive Board, and
the implementing member-states, who are bound by the norms adopted by the
regime-level administrative body. This arrangement is analogous to that of the
E.U., in which member states implement E.U. regulations subject to the supervision of the Commission and the Court of Justice, and to systems of “cooperative federalism” in the United States, under which states implement federal environmental, social service, and other regulatory programs under the supervision of federal administrative authorities and courts.
The conception that non-state actors are the regulated entities presents an
evolution of international regulation away from a state-centric mode and towards a conception of global regulation of market actors, with states serving an
intermediate position. Examples of such regimes include the WTO, the Montreal Protocol, and the Kyoto Protocol.
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)—and especially the Appellate
Body—has increasingly defined its role as promoting the sound and consistent
regulation of the international trade regime. The DSB understands that the
ultimate subjects of trade regulation are market economic actors, and that its
role is to promote open and even-handed competition and predictability in the
collective regulatory trade fabric (woven out of individual member state decisionmaking procedures and measures and out of WTO law), consistent with
appropriate regard for member state latitude in domestic policies. DSB proceedings initiated by member states are formally the adjudication of disputes
between states; but functionally, in many instances, they are the occasion for
the DSB to exercise this supervisory and reviewing role over the implementation of the WTO trade regulatory regime. Further, there are emerging signs
that the DSB regards member states as administrative agencies within this system. In order to promote an even-handed and predictable system of international trade regulation, the DSB has required member states that adopt traderestrictive regulatory measures to adopt administrative law disciplines, including providing decisional transparency, opportunity for affected private parties
to be heard, and reasoned justifications for decisions made.133 These rulings
133. See Sabino Cassese, supra note 120; Giacinto della Cananea, supra note 120.
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very much resemble those of U.S. courts reviewing administrative agency decisions. The reformation of regulatory decisionmaking by domestic administrative agencies through global administrative law disciplines will be further intensified with implementation of the TRIPS and GATS agreements.
The Kyoto Protocol is another example of a regime that is substantially oriented towards regulation of market actors, who play an explicit, implementing
role in the CDM and who will play an important role in the other flexibility
mechanisms, especially emissions allowance trading. In order to secure effective regulatory implementation by Annex I Parties, the COP/MOP has established a compliance mechanism by creating a regime-level administrative body,
the Compliance Committee, consisting of a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch.134 The enforcement branch can review member state compliance
and thereby secure the environmental and economic integrity of global emissions trading systems in which private actors will play an important role.
The Montreal Protocol similarly aims at effective regulation of private market actors; among other matters, it addresses issues of industrial rationalization
in ozone-depleting substances (ODS) production and ODS trade-related issues.135 The Protocol was one of the first environmental regimes that included
an institutionalized compliance mechanism involving a regime-level body of an
administrative nature, the Implementation Committee, which has the authority
to decide on compliance measures and potential sanctions, although in practice
it has tended to follow a cooperative, facilitative approach to dealing with countries’ compliance difficulties.
Under the three above regimes, non-compliance proceedings are initiated
by State Parties, although under the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols, regimelevel administrative authorities can also initiate compliance proceedings. Enforcement by States is not inconsistent with a conception of the regimes in
which private market actors are the subjects of regulation; compliant Member
States and their firms have a strong economic interest in correcting noncompliance by other member states in order to protect their own firms against
unfair competition from firms in non-compliant states.
The International Labor Organization provides for initiation of noncompliance proceedings by private market actors against member States that
fail to implement ILO norms. An industrial association of employers or workers can file a complaint with the International Labor Office that a Member
State has failed to secure the effective observance within its jurisdiction of an
ILO Convention to which it is a party. The ILO Governing Body in its turn
may communicate this representation to the government against which the
complaint is made and invite that government to make a statement on the sub134. Conference of the Parties Decision 24/CP.7 “Procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol,” in Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session,
Held at Marrakesh, 29 October to 10 November 2001, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the
Conference of the Parties, Vol. 3, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (Jan. 21, 2002).
135. On the Montreal Protocol and non-compliance, see Markus Ehrmann, Procedures of Compliance Control in International Environmental Treaties, 13 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 377 (2002).
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ject. If the government does not produce a statement within a reasonable time
or if the statement is not deemed to be satisfactory by the Governing Body, this
Body has the right to publish the representation and the statement, if any, made
in reply to it.136
3. Complex Regimes
A number of the regimes discussed above have such a high degree of institutional differentiation and legalization that they can be classified as complex regimes; such regimes are most likely to exhibit the characteristics of delegation
and norm specificity and authority that are favorable to the development of
U.S.-style administrative law at the regime level.
One form of complexity is found in regimes whose regulatory norms (1) include subsidiary norms adopted by the member states (often by majority vote)
or by regime-level administrative bodies, and (2) govern the conduct of individual member states but are also implemented by member states with the objective of regulating private sector actors.137 This arrangement combines the two
conceptions of international regulatory regimes set forth above: those that di138
rectly regulate non-state actors and those that regulate member state conduct.
Examples of such arrangements include the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol, the OIE, the World Bank, the LOS seabed regime, and possibly the ILO.
When the WTO DSB is regarded as an administrative authority, the WTO can
also be included.
In addition, some of these regimes provide for a further degree of institutional differentiation and legalization by establishing a regime-level reviewing
body that can review either the adoption of subsidiary norms by regime administrative bodies or compliance by individual member states with regime norms
(both primary and subsidiary), or both. Examples of such tribunals include the
World Bank Inspection Panel and the compliance institutions established under
the Montreal Protocol and Kyoto Protocol. This is also the legal institutional
model generally followed for E.C. regulation. A still greater degree of complexity is provided by global regimes with the power to directly regulate private
market actors as well as the conduct of member states and to use them as administrative bodies to implement regulation of private market actors. Combining these arrangements with a regime-level reviewing tribunal results in the
greatest degree of institutional differentiation and legalization.
This is the model followed in the United States under “cooperative federalism” programs in which, for example, states exercise delegated authority to implement federal environmental statutes by regulating private actors; in doing so,
136. Constitution of the International Labor Organization, June 28, 1919, arts. 24, 25, 49, Stat. 2712,
15 U.N.T.S. 35.
137. Still another potential conception is to view regime tribunals as the administrative bodies generating subsidiary norms that bind member states or regulated firms. It is possible to view powerful
regime tribunals such as the DSB in this fashion. But this conception leaves no conceptual or institutional space for a separate reviewing tribunal, unless a general international court with jurisdiction to
review the decisions of the various tribunals of individual regimes were to emerge.
138. See supra Part IV.A.1-2.
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they must follow requirements adopted by the federal EPA and thus be subject
to review by federal courts. Regulated actors are also subject to direct enforcement actions by EPA. The international regulatory regime that most
closely approximates this model is the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM Executive
Board is already exercising the power to develop and apply subsidiary norms
that bind member states and private actors, and the Subsidiary Bodies for Implementation and Technical Assistance are approaching this function. The development of Kyoto Protocol regime compliance mechanisms are likely to include a tribunal that will review not only compliance by member states but also
by private market actors, as well as the generation of subsidiary norms by regime administrative bodies. Because the success of global emissions trading
markets is essential to the success of the regulatory scheme, the regime and
states participating in it will have strong incentives to develop the necessary institutional means of meeting the need of market actors for legal predictability
and swift resolution of disputes.
Another element of complexity is the extent to which global regulatory regimes have sought to transform domestic administrative law in order to ensure
more effective implementation by domestic administrative agencies of the
global regulatory system. Professors Cassese and della Cananea have shown
how the WTO DSB is developing a body of requirements for Member State
decisionmaking in domestic trade-related regulatory administration that
amounts to a globalized system of administrative law at the domestic level.139
These developments will intensify as TRIPS and GATS are fully implemented.
These systems of administrative law are designed and required to ensure effective implementation of global regulatory regime norms in member states with
the objective of effective and consistent regulation of public and private market
actors. Similar systems of administrative law to assure proper implementation
are found in the development of an E.U. administrative law applicable to member states and in “cooperative federalism” arrangements in the United States.
Such systems are likely to emerge under other intentional regulatory regimes,
such as the Kyoto Protocol or its equivalent, that rely on statutory-adjudicatory
strategies to achieve effective and uniform regulation of global market actors.
A final element of complexity is created when several international regulatory regimes deal in a linked way with the same area. Examples include the
WTO, Codex, and IOE in the context of food and plant safety regulation. Another is the interaction of the WTO and TRIPS, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research in dealing with plant genetic resources.140 Such complex regimes exhibit arrangements of functions and authorities that are partially shared and partially independent, creating a global

139. See Sabino Cassese, supra note 120; Giacinto della Cananea, supra note 120.
140. Kal Raustiala & David Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT’L
ORG. 277 (2004).
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version of separation of powers; the implications for the development of administrative law have yet to be addressed.
These various elements of complexity make out a large and important field
for further research. A systematic comparative analysis of the most important
international regulatory regimes, using typologies like those advanced in this
article, would be of great value in considering the potential for a global administrative law as well as for the study of global regulatory institutions more generally.
B. Implications of Regime Structure for Development of Administrative Law
at the Global Regulatory Regime Level
1. Administrative Law Elements in Different Global Regulatory Regimes:
Emerging Patterns
The basic elements of administrative law include transparency and access to
information; participation in administrative decisionmaking through the submission of information, analysis, and views; a requirement of a reasoned decision by the administrative decisionmaker; review of the decision for legality by
an independent tribunal; and the application of the reviewing body of certain
substantive principles such as means-ends rationality and proportionality. U.S.
administrative law presents these elements in an especially strong form.141
As might be expected, the adoption of administrative law elements tends to
be significantly greater in complex treaty-based regulatory regimes that are
relatively highly institutionally differentiated and legalized, and that have welldeveloped administrative bodies. The extent of the regime’s impact on private
market actors and the extent of NGO activity also appear to be important factors. There has been a considerable development of international NGOs in the
past fifteen years as they have lobbied for greater transparency and participation in global regulatory regimes. Also, domestic NGOs in the U.S. and elsewhere, frustrated by the limited availability and efficacy of opportunities to influence global regulation through domestic political and administrative law
mechanisms, have begun to focus on issues of transparency, participation, and
review at the global regulatory regime level. NGO attention at the global level
has, however, been selective. For example, the World Bank, the WTO, and the
Codex are among the regimes that have been targeted for reform, whereas relatively little attention has been paid to other perhaps equally important regimes,
such as the IMF and banking regulation.
Participation through established procedures in regime administrative decisionmaking is considerably advanced in some relatively complex treaty-based
international regulatory regimes with strong, norm-generating administrative
141. See supra, Part II. It is far beyond the scope of this article to catalogue or analyze the extent to
which these various elements of administrative law have been adopted within various global regulatory
regimes. These questions are part of the research agenda of the NYU Project on Global Administrative Law (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.). See http://www.iilj.org/global_adlaw/index.html (last
visited Mar. 21, 2005).
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authorities, such as the Codex, OIE, the Montreal Protocol, and the Kyoto Protocol. The decisions of these regimes is of great importance and interest both to
multinational businesses and to NGOs, who have lobbied strongly for transparency and participation. Transparency and participation have been extensively
developed under CITES, which has been a strong focus of environmental NGO
energies. However, none of these regimes has developed a reviewing body
analogous to courts or administrative tribunals within domestic systems. Thus,
the OIE, Codex, and CITES have no reviewing body. The Montreal Protocol
non-compliance mechanism assists and prods member states to achieve compliance. The non-compliance mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol are still being
constructed and no reviewing function has emerged within the CDM, although
there will be strong pressures to develop one.
The Codex provides a good example of experience with the development of
greater transparency and participation over the past fifteen years. Founded in
1962 by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Health
Organization (WHO), the Codex is responsible for developing and adopting
food safety standards that relate to human health. Until the adoption of the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) Agreement in 1994, Codex was
largely hidden from public scrutiny as the standards it adopted were nonbinding. Because of the non-binding nature of its work, the Codex did not
arouse much attention from stakeholders or the media,142 and was primarily a
technocratic forum dominated by government experts. The Codex’s relative
anonymity ended with the implementation of the SPS Agreement, which gave
WTO member states strong incentives to adopt Codex standards as a “safe harbor” against WTO challenge.143 This stimulated increased interest by NGOs in
the work of the Codex. Several NGOs applied for and received observer status,
while others were able to place their representatives as parts of national delegations in order to influence regulatory decisions by Codex administrative bodies.144
In other regimes, including the World Bank, human rights bodies, and the
ILO, non-state actors have the ability to invoke reviewing body procedures. In
the case of the ILO and the human rights regimes, review is directed to compliance by member states. The human rights regimes lack developed administrative authorities, while the ILO follows a corporatist model, which is probably
not conducive to the development of administrative law on the U.S. model. In
the case of the World Bank, review is directed at compliance by the administrative arm of the bank itself, which is a strong body with the ability to adopt and
142. However, Codex did provide opportunities for certain stakeholders to participate in its work.
See Codex Alimentarius Commission, NGO Participation (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.),
available at http://www.codexaliment arius.net/ngo_participation.stm (last visited Mar. 21, 2005)
[hereinafter NGO Participation].
143. Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization
and International Organizations: The Roles of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International
Plant Protection Convention, and the International Office of Epizootics, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. &
COM. 27, 41-43 (1998).
144. Livshiz, supra note 50, at 4, 21.
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implement subsidiary norms. This creates a situation favorable to the further
development of administrative law.
In parallel with the development of the Inspection Panel, the Bank has also
taken steps to promote transparency and to develop opportunities for participation through consultation with respect to both general Bank policies and major
Bank-funded development projects; the interaction between these participation
opportunities and the availability of review through the Inspection Panel, however, has yet to be systematically examined. The Bank thus represents a relatively highly advanced stage of administrative law, although still short of incorporating all of the elements of a U.S. model. It is striking that the state of administrative law at the IMF, a sister Bretton Woods institution with a quite
similar governance structure, should still be so rudimentary. The extent to
which this disparity is due to the differences in the subjects regulated by the two
institutions or other factors is still to be adequately examined.145
The WTO is an example of a treaty-based regime that lacks an administrative body with authority to generate and implement subsidiary norms; instead,
this function is carried out exclusively by the DSB. As discussed above, the
DSB has, perhaps inevitably, given the absence of a strong WTO administrative
body, increasingly assumed functions that are regulatory and administrative in
character. Thus, the Appellate Body has sought to use the resolution of particular disputes regarding member state compliance to develop systemic norms
and procedures to govern the trade regulatory regime, including the development of a global administrative law for member state authorities whose decisions are regulated by WTO law. Inevitably, NGOs (and to a much lesser extent business interests, who often feel that they are adequately represented
through their governments) have sought increased transparency and rights of
participation in order to be able to monitor and influence the discharge by the
DSB of these administrative functions. But because the DSB is in form a tribunal, this effort has focused on the submission of amicus briefs, which have been
strongly resisted by developing countries fearful of disproportionate “northern”
NGO influence on DSB decisions.146 Dispute settlement tribunals established
under NAFTA Chapter 11 and bilateral investment treaties addressing regulatory expropriation claims by investors have come under similar pressures from
NGOs, who have sought greater transparency in their decisional processes and
the right to intervene and submit amicus briefs, as these bodies increasingly as-

145. For discussion of the state of accountability mechanisms at the IMF and World Bank, see Dana
L. Clark, The World Bank and Human Rights: The Need for Greater Accountability, 15 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 205 (2002); John W. Head, Seven Deadly Sins: An Assessment of Criticisms Aimed at the International Monetary Fund, 52 KAN. L. REV. 521 (2004); John W. Head, For Richer or For Poorer: Assessing
the Criticisms Directed at Multilateral Development Banks, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 241 (2004); Ngaire
Woods, Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable, 77 INT’L AFFAIRS 83 (2001).
146. Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
173, 214-15 (2000); Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World
Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 331, 348-53 (1996).
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sume functions that are administrative in character, including the development
of an administrative law for domestic regulators.147
Other treaty-based global regulatory regimes follow a state-centric model of
governance with only limited administrative law elements, even in those regimes that have developed administrative bodies with significant functions. Examples include the IMF and the Security Council 1267 Committee. This is also
true of many global regulatory networks, including those dealing with antitrust/competition law, debt relief for developing countries (Paris Club), and
money laundering (Financial Action Task Force). But other regulatory networks have begun to develop significant elements of transparency and participation. For example, the Basel Committee, which deals with bank regulation,
adopted its original capital adequacy requirements through an entirely closed
“club” process. But in developing the second version of these requirements, it
established a website on which drafts and background materials were posted
and requested comments.148 ISOCO, the international club of securities regulators, is following a similar path.149 The international system of cooperation in
chemicals regulation has developed an elaborate governance system involving a
plethora of expert committees that also provides avenues for participation by
NGOs, such as those concerned with use of animals for testing.150 These developments appear to be attributable to a desire on the part of the regime members to boost their legitimacy with outside constituencies, obtain information
and feedback to improve the quality of their regulatory efforts, or a combination of both. Thus far, however, similar institutional differentiation or the development of administrative law elements has not occurred or has occurred
only to a quite limited degree in regimes of horizontal cooperation for mutual
recognition or regulatory equivalency determinations.
2. Administrative Law Lite?
The preceding overview confirms that development of a U.S.-style administrative law at the level of international regulatory regimes requires a relatively
high degree of institutional differentiation, legalization, and complexity, which
is often but not always associated with a statutory–regulatory approach to regulation. The most favorable condition for the adoption of most administrative
law elements appears to be when a global regulatory organization has administrative bodies with important norm-generating power and an independent reviewing body, as is the case with the World Bank, although there has been significant development of administrative law elements in bodies, such as the Codex, that lack an independent review function.

147. See, e.g., Fulvio Fracassi, Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L.
213 (2001).
148. See Zaring, supra note 93, at 28-32.
149. See id. at 18-20.
150. See James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
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Another hospitable condition for the development of administrative law is
provided by domestic administrative authorities that implement regulatory law
developed or implemented by global administrative bodies or tribunals, especially when there are domestic systems of independent review. This provides
the institutional preconditions for global institution requirements that domestic
governments adopt global administrative law elements to ensure effective and
faithful implementation of global regulatory law. Here the WTO and its DSB
are taking the lead under agreements such as SPS, TRIPS, and GATS, although
investor protection treaty tribunals and the World Bank (through “good government” initiatives) are also beginning to have a similar impact.
Yet even the most fully developed systems of administrative law in global
regulatory institutions, such as the World Bank or Codex, do not include all of
the administrative law elements in the state of development found in the U.S or
other advanced countries. Significant administrative law developments are
found in many treaty-based regimes and some regulatory networks, but almost
always without independent reviewing authority. The state of administrative
law in other treaty-based regimes, regulatory networks, and in all or almost all
regimes of horizontal mutual recognition or equivalency cooperation is generally rudimentary at best. The independent reviewing courts that play an essential role in administrative law in the United States and Europe and other advanced countries are generally absent.
Traditionally in international law, states have been most reluctant to establish strong independent tribunals to review state compliance with treaty regime
norms; the WTO, UNCLOS and certain human rights tribunals are among the
conspicuous exceptions. The reasons for this reluctance apply with less force to
independent mechanisms of review of the decisions of regime-level administrative authorities, as opposed to member states, yet there is a dearth of such reviewing bodies. Thus, for most global regimes for the foreseeable future, administrative law will probably have to be built without the presence of strong
reviewing courts or similar bodies.
In these circumstances, can some subset of the elements and functions of
U.S.-style administrative law that do not require a strong, independent reviewing authority be successfully applied to less institutionally differentiated global
regulatory regimes? These elements include arrangements for public access to
information and other mechanisms to promote decisional transparency on the
part of regimes’ decisionmaking institutions, including legislative and administrative bodies and reviewing bodies; notice and opportunity for public comment
and input of decisions by such institutions; and other mechanisms for participation in regime decisionmaking, as through attendance at meetings in which decisions are discussed or taken and through membership on advisory or even decisionmaking bodies. These mechanisms might provide a substantial degree of
informal responsiveness to those domestic or global economic and social interests that are organized and are able to take advantage of the opportunities provided by these mechanisms to monitor and influence regime-level decisions.
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But they will not provide strong assurances of legality accountability, and indeed might even undermine legality, as the U.S. experience with regulatory negotiation suggests.151
From a U.S. perspective, such an approach represents, at best, “administrative law lite.” By elevating accountability to interests over accountability for
legality, it inverts the order of development and of priorities in U.S. administrative law, which gives precedence to assuring agency compliance with the Constitution, statutes, and the agency’s own regulations over review of the exercise of
discretion.152 Indeed, it is questionable whether mechanisms that do not provide
assurances of legality can properly be regarded as administrative law; arguably
they can at most be regarded as tools of administrative governance. Beyond
relying on courts to ensure the legality of administrative action, the United
States has in recent decades placed a high value on the authority of judges to
engage in “hard look” reviews of the exercise of agency discretion and to ensure reasoned justification for agency policy choices in relation to affected social interests and underlying facts and analysis. Other procedural and institutional mechanisms alone have not been thought sufficient to secure the goal of
deliberative democracy in the context of administrative regulation. Yet, as previously noted, in the international institutional context, states have generally
been quite unwilling to create and cede to other bodies the power to make authoritative determinations of legality or to review the exercise of discretion by
regime bodies with subsidiary norm-creating authority.
Is would be exceedingly parochial to think that there can be no genuine system of administrative law without the sort of judicial review that has been the
centerpiece of U.S. and, increasingly, European models of administrative law.
Indeed, the growth of relatively informal network-based approaches to regulation at the domestic level in the United States are posing a serious challenge to
traditional models of administrative law built on command and control strategies of regulation.153 Similar issues are arising in Europe. Conceptions of administrative law built solely on accountability to social interests and values
through mechanisms of transparency and participation without strong reviewing
tribunals have, however, yet to be developed. Nonetheless, as Grant and Keohane remind us, there are many mechanisms of accountability other than law
that can be applied to global regimes, including hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal,
market, peer and public reputational accountability.154 It is quite possible that a
combination of elements of transparency and participation, when combined
with other mechanisms of accountability, can function successfully without independent legal review.
151. See William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes, Regulation, Negotiation and The Public
Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987).
152. This priority order is reflected in judicial decisions on reviewability. Courts are much more
reluctant to find that an agency action is not reviewable when it is challenged as violating the Constitution or a statutory requirement or limitation than when it is challenged on abuse of discretion grounds.
153. See Stewart, supra note 35.
154. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 4.
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3. Prospects for Further Development of Administrative Law in Global
Regulatory Regimes
The experience in industrialized countries indicates that the need for institutional specialization, including the use of both administrative and reviewing
bodies, generally increases as the intensity of regulation increases. Growing
global regulatory density will require the elaboration of more detailed norms
and implementing arrangements. It also requires constant informationgathering, analysis, and evaluation of the performance of existing regulatory
arrangements and the ability to make necessary changes to improve performance in a timely manner. Hence, legislative bodies create and delegate authority to subsidiary administrative bodies to elaborate, update, and implement
regulatory norms. Such delegations in turn invite the creation of specialized
reviewing bodies to police conformance by administrative bodies with the terms
of the delegation and promote impartial and reasonably predictable administration.
Experience in Europe and the United States suggests that the need for institutional differentiation and legalization of regulatory administration is especially great in two-level jurisdictional systems when it is thought necessary to
have a system of regulation at the higher level in order to address problems of
decentralized regulation by many lower level jurisdictions and to assure a regulatory “level playing field” among private firms competing in a common market. There are reasons for thinking that this same functional and institutional
logic will operate at the global level in addressing problems like climate change,
food, and chemical safety, and many other areas of regulation. If so, we might
expect increasing institutional differentiation and legalization in global regulatory regimes, and a concomitant growth in global administrative law at both the
global and domestic levels.
The experience in the United States and the European Union, however,
might not necessarily translate inexorably or uniformly into the global context,
which has very different political and institutional features. In this context,
more informal methods of cooperation in achieving common objectives, including through regulatory networks and transnational cooperation between regulators in individual countries on equivalency and other issues, might often have
functional superiority or be the best that can achieved within the overall political structural context of international relations. As already noted, these less
formal regimes are not as favorable to development of administrative law.
Moreover, private and hybrid public–private regulatory organizations and networks are coming to play an important role in setting global technical standards
for products and services, developing labeling and regulatory programs to ensure that forest products, apparel, coffee, and other products meet consumers’
environmental and labor concerns, and regulating services in areas such as accounting. Theses regimes, and their domestic counterparts, also present a deep
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challenge to domestic systems of administrative law developed in a statutory–
adjudicatory context.155
The considerations influencing global regulatory institutional arrangements
and the adoption of administrative law elements are political as well as functional. One must therefore examine, in the context of different types international regulatory regimes, the incentives faced by states in deciding whether to
delegate authority for and thereby lose a degree of control over the adoption
and content and application of regime norms. The role and the incentives of
non-state actors with respect to such decisions are also critically important in
many contexts.156 Although these issues have been studied extensively in the
domestic context in the United States and, to a more limited but growing extent
in Europe,157 social science research is just beginning to address them at the level
of international regimes.
V
CONCLUSION
This article has examined the potential applications of administrative law
disciplines—in particular of U.S.-style administrative law—to global regulatory
regimes, considering both a “bottom up” and a “top down” approach. The extent and intensity of global regulation and the development of global administrative functions and institutions will continue to grow. This development will
inevitably result in greater demands for administrative law mechanisms of accountability for the decisions of global regulatory regimes. Unless those regimes move more rapidly than they have in the past to adopt such mechanisms
at the regime level, we are likely to witness the extension, by one means or another, of domestic administrative law disciplines of judicial review, of participation and transparency, of reasoned decision requirements, and of other administrative law elements to their decisions. These developments, or their threat,
will help stimulate the further development of administrative law within global
regulatory bodies. At the same time, some global regulatory regimes will continue the process of developing administrative law requirements for domestic
decisionmaking by states that are members of the global regulatory regimes.
Such steps will likely have a reciprocal influence back on the development of
administrative law at the international regime level. It will be increasingly difficult for global regulatory bodies to resist administrative law disciplines that they
themselves impose on member states.
The development of global administrative law, however, is by no means an
inevitably forward process. Because administrative law as traditionally understood, especially in the United States and other advanced countries, depends on
a relatively high degree of institutional differentiation and legalization, a critical
155. See Stewart, supra note 35.
156. See Benvenisti, supra note 30.
157. See Francesca Bignami, Creating Rights in the Age of Global Governance: Mental Maps and
Strategic Interests in Europe, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. (2005).
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question is the extent to which international regulatory institutions will develop
in the direction of greater complexity and legalization. Will there be increasing
use of more ambitious and penetrating statutory–adjudicatory systems of regulation, which are likely to bring in its train a system of administrative law that
bears some resemblance to those in advanced industrial societies? Or will we
see a continuing proliferation of relatively informal regulatory networks and
horizontal methods of regulatory cooperation and accommodation, as well as
private and private-public regulatory mechanisms that will be less hospitable to
administrative law institutions based on traditional domestic models? And,
what are the incentives of states and powerful non-state actors regarding the
development of global administrative law in different areas of regulations?
A final issue is the potential linkage, if any, between global administrative
law and democracy.158 A system of electorally based representative democracy
at the global level is at present far beyond reach. Nor does a consociational
conception of democracy at the global level based on civil society entities seem
viable. Nonetheless, the development of a global administrative law, including
through “bottom up” as well as “top down” approaches, could work to
strengthen representative democracy at the national level by making global
regulatory decisions and institutions more visible and subject to effective scrutiny and review within domestic political systems, and thereby promote the accountability of international regulatory decisionmakers through those systems.159 Systems of global administrative law might also support the development of deliberative democracy at the level of global regulatory regimes, although the elements of such a conception as well as the conditions of its effective realization have yet to be adequately developed.

158. See Robert Howse, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and the Problem of Democracy, in
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS, 469
(George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2000).
159. SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 6, at 231-37.

